UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-17-2016

Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brook View
Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43452

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brook View Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43452" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6264.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6264

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a body
politic corporate of the State of Idaho,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Supreme Court Docket No. 43452

vs.
BROOKE VIEW, INC., d/b/a THE SENATOR,
INC., an Idaho corporation; BENCH SEWER
DISTRICT; JOE J. HON AND WILLIAM A.
HON d/b/a FRANKLIN WATER COMPANY;
TILLIE MAE SAXTON, a widow; VINCENT
LEE HUMPHREYS AND ESTHER C.
HUMPHREYS, husband and wife; KENNETH
RICHARDSON AND EFFIE R. RICHARDSON;
and all unknown lessees and tenants in possession
of any or all of the property which is subject to this
action, and any other person or entity, who has or
may have an interest in and to the property which
is subject of this action, referenced for
convenience by the fictitious designations of
DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

Ada County District Court
No. CV-2012-12275

Defendants-Appellees.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Idaho
Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, Presiding
MaryV. York
Scott D. Hess
A. Dean Bennett
HOLLAND & HART LLP
800 West Main Street, Suite 1750
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701
Kimbell D. Gourley
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN
GOURLEY, P.A.
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820
P.O. Box 1097
Boise, ID 83701

Attorneys for Appellant

E Don Copple
Heather A. Cunningham
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
199 N. Capital Blvd., Suite 600
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

Attorneys for Appellees

FILED . COPY
JUN 17 2016
Supreme CourL......court ot Appeals=._
Entered on ATS b y _

!

!

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a body
politic corporate of the State of Idaho,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Supreme Court Docket No. 43452

vs.
BROOKE VIEW, INC., d/b/a THE SENATOR,
INC., an Idaho corporation; BENCH SEWER
DISTRICT; JOE J. HON AND WILLIAM A.
HON d/b/a FRANKLIN WATER COMPANY;
TILLIE MAE SAXTON, a widow; VINCENT
LEE HUMPHREYS AND ESTHER C.
HUMPHREYS, husband and wife; KENNETH
RICHARDSON AND EFFIE R. RICHARDSON;
and all unknown lessees and tenants in possession
of any or all of the property which is subject to this
action, and any other person or entity, who has or
may have an interest in and to the property which
is subject of this action, referenced for
convenience by the fictitious designations of
DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

Ada County District Court
No. CV-2012-12275

Defendants-A ,pellees.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Idaho
Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, Presiding
MaryV. York
Scott D. Hess
A. Dean Bennett
HOLLAND & HART LLP
800 West Main Street, Suite 1750
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701
Kimbell D. Gourley
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN
GOURLEY, P.A.
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820
P.O. Box 1097
Boise, ID 83701

Attorneys for Appellant

E Don Copple
Heather A. Cunningham
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
199 N. Capital Blvd., Suite 600
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

Attorneys for Appe/lees

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1

IL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................ 5
A. NATURE OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................ 5

B.

1.

ACHD Project. ........................................................................................................... 5

2.

The Brooke View Property and the Taking ............................................................... 6

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS .................................................................................................. 8

1.

ACHD's Amended Complaint, the Scope of the Take, and Order for
Possession .................................................................................................................. 9

2.

The Pre-Trial Proceedings Spanned Nearly Three Years .......................................... 9

3.

The Issue of Whether Brooke View Could Recover Damages for Activities
That Occurred During Construction of the Project Became The Central
Focus of The Litigation............................................................................................ 10

4.

The District Court's Denial of ACHD's Second Motion for Summary
Judgment. ................................................................................................................. 12

5.

The District Court's Denial of ACHD's Motion for Reconsideration of
Second Motion for Summary Judgment and ACHD's Third Motion for
Summary Judgment. ................................................................................................. 13

6.

This Court's Denial of ACHD's Request for Interlocutory Appeal. ....................... 15

7.

The District Court's Denial of ACHD's Fourth Motion for Summary
Judgment. ................................................................................................................. 15

8.

ACHD's Settlement Offers And Attempts to Resolve The Case Before
Trial. ......................................................................................................................... 17

9.

The Trial and Jury Instructions ................................................................................ 17

10. The Jury's Verdict and Entry of Judgment. ............................................................. 22

- 1-

11. The District Court's Award of Attorney Fees and Costs to Brooke View ............... 23
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................................... 23
IV. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 24
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................................... 24
B.

THE RIGHT TO SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN AN IDAHO CONDEMNATION ACTION
ARISES FROM IDAHO CODE § 7-711 ........................................ ····· ......... ········ ................... 26

C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION As To THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE § 7-711 ....................................................................... 29
1.

The District Court's Erroneous Interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) is Contrary
to Well-established Standards for Determining Severance Damages in
Condemnation Actions and is Directly Contrary to the Requirements of
§ 7-712 ..................................................................................................................... 30

2.

The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7-711 is Contrary to Long-Standing
Idaho Case Law That Precludes Severance Damages for Impacts or Damage
Occurring During Construction................................................................................ 33
a.

The Case of Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company v.
Campbell Precludes Severance Damage Awards for Construction
Activities that Take Place After the Date of Summons .................................... 34

b.

Consistent with Campbell and Idaho-Western, Numerous Other Idaho
Cases Have Applied§ 7-711(2)(a) to Mean the Structures or
Improvements to Be Built and Not to Physical Construction Activities
and Alleged Damage Caused During Those Activities .................................... 38

3.

Idaho Code§ 7-711 Does Not Permit A Landowner to Recover for Every
Type of Damage Caused to His or Her Property As Part of Just
Compensation ........................................................................................................... 40

4.

Cases In Other Jurisdictions Are In Accord with Campbell and IdahoWestern and Require That Damage Caused During Construction Are Not
Compensable In A Condemnation Action .............................................................. .42

5.

The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) Invalidates 30 Years
of Eminent Domain Case Law Governing Attorney Fee Awards in
Condemnation Actions ............................................................................................. 46

- 11 -

6.

The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) Effectively Eliminates
the Design Immunity Afforded to Public Entities .................................................. .49

7.

The District Court's Erroneous Decision to Allow Evidence of Damage
Caused During the Acts of Construction was Further Compounded Because
it Prohibited ACHD From Offering Tort Defenses ................................................. 52

8.

The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) Will Lead to
Inconsistent Results .................................................................................................. 54
a.

Scenario 1: Two Adjoining Property Owners and the Condemnation of
the Property of Only One Owner...................................................................... 55

b.

Scenario 2: Two Adjoining Property Owners and the Condemnation of
Property of Both Owners .................................................................................. 55

D. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 7711(2)(A) RESULTED IN IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE BEING PRESENTED
TO THE JURY AND FORMED THE BASIS OF THE JURY'S VERDICT ...................................... 56
E.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE CONTRARY TO IDAHO'S
EMINENT DOMAIN LA ws ................................................................................................. 58

F.

THIS COURT SHOULD VA CATE THE JUDGMENT AND REMAND THIS MATTER WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $8,512.32 ............................... 60

G. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACHD ITS REASONABLE COSTS As

THE PREVAILING PARTY................................................................................................... 61
1.

The Criteria for Determining the Prevailing Party in Idaho Condemnation
Cases ........................................................................................................................ 61

2.

ACHD is Clearly the Prevailing Party..................................................................... 63
a.

ACHD made an offer of settlement of at least 90% of the verdict. .................. 63

b.

ACHD's settlement offers were timely made and within a reasonable
period after the institution of action................................................................... 64

H. THE AWARD OF DISCRETIONARY COSTS SHOULD BE REVERSED OR REDUCED ................ 64
1.

The District Court's Conclusion that this Case Was Extraordinary Was an
Abuse of Discretion .................................................................................................. 64

- lll -

2.

I.

The District Court's Award of Discretionary Costs Should At The Very
Least Be Reduced.

ACHD IS ENTITLED To COSTS ON APPEAL. ..................................................................... 67

V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 67

- IV -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES

Ada Cty. Highway District v. Acarrequi,
105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983) ................ .,,, ..... ,. ...................................................passim
Albee v. Judy,
136 Idaho 226, 31 P .3d 248 (2001) ......................................................................................... 25
Arel v. T & L Enter., Inc.,
146 Idaho 29, 189 P.3d 1149 (2008) ....................................................................................... 25
Beehler v. Fremont Cty.,
145 Idaho 656, 182 P.3d 713 (Ct. App. 2008) ......................................................................... 51
Brown v. City of Twin Falls,
124 Idaho 39,855 P.2d 876 (1993) ........................................................................................ .41
Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co.,
21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830 (1911) .............................................................................................. .41
City ofAnchorage v. Scavenius,
539 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1975) ...........................................................................................passim
City ofSandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist.,
139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 (2003) .......................................................................................... .49
Cramer v. Slater,
146 Idaho 868,204 P.3d 508 (2009) ....................................................................................... 52
Davis v. First Interstate Bank ofIdaho, NA.,
115 Idaho 169, 765 P.2d 680 (1988) ................................................................................... 2, 52
State, Dep 't of Transp. v. Hillsboro Ass 'n, Inc.,
286 So. 2d 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) .................................................................. .44, 45, 52
Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co.,
152 Idaho 562,272 P.3d 534 (2012) ....................................................................................... 54
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,
147 Idaho 307,208 P.3d 289 (2009) ....................................................................................... 25

-i-

Friends ofFarm to Mkt. v. Valley Cty.,
137 Idaho 192, 46 P.3d 9 (2002) ............................................................................................. 54
Garcia v. Windley,
144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819 (2007) ....................................................................................... 12
Hadfield v. State ex rel. Burns,
86 Idaho 561,388 P.2d 1018 (1963) ...................................................................................... .41
Harris v. State, Dep 't. ofHealth & Welfare,
123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992) ..................................................................................... 53
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn,
141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005) ....................................................................................... 65
Hoagland v. Ada Cty.,
154 Idaho 900,303 P.3d 587 (2013) ....................................................................................... 66
Hughes v. State,
80 Idaho 286,328 P.2d 397 (1958) ................................................................................... 38, 40
Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference ofEvangelical Lutheran Augustana
Synod.,
20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 60 (1911) ........................................................................................passim
Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Talbot,
152 N.E. 486 (1926) ................................................................................................................ 56
Kirkv. Ford Motor Co.,
141 Idaho 697, 116 P.3d 27 (2005) ......................................................................................... 26
Leazer v. Kiefer,
120 Idaho 902,821 P.2d 957 (1991) ....................................................................................... 60
Lobdell v. State ex rel. Bd. ofHighway Dirs.,
89 Idaho 559,407 P.2d 135 (1965) ......................................................................................... 31
Lubcke v. Boise City Ada Cty. Housing Auth.,
124 Idaho 450, 860 P.2d 653 (1993) ....................................................................................... 26
Mabe v. State,
86 Idaho 254,385 P.2d 401 (1963) .................................................................................. .41, 56

- 11 -

Mac Tools, Inc. v. Griffin,
126 Idaho 193,879 P.2d 1126 (1994)

26

Merritt v. State,
113 Idaho 142, 742 P.2d 397 (1987) ...................................................................................... .41
Montana R.R. Co. v. Freeser,
29 Mont. 210, 74 P. 407 (Mont. 1903) .......................................................................... 3, 44, 52
Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass 'n,
140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004) ........................................................................................ .40
Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep't ofHomeland Sec.,
600 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................. 39
Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Campbell,
34 Idaho 601,202 P. 1065 (1921) ....................................................................................passim
Pac. Nw. Pipeline Corp. v. Waller,
80 Idaho 105,326 P.2d 388 (1958) .................................................................................. .41, 45
Palmer v. Highway Dist. No. 1, Bonner Cty.,
49 Idaho 596,290 P. 393 (1930) ............................................................................................. 41
Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc.,
101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980) ....................................................................................... 53
Porter v. Bd. of Tr., Preston Sch. Dist. No. 201,
141 Idaho 11, 105 P.3d 671 (2004) ......................................................................................... 25
Powell v. McKelvey,
56 Idaho 291, 53 P.2d 626 (1935) ............................................................................... 39, 40, 56
St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd v. Bd. of Cty. Comm 'rs of Gooding Cty.,
149 Idaho 584,237 P.3d 1210 (2010) ..................................................................................... 32
State, Dept. ofTransp. v. HJ Grathol,
153 Idaho 87,278 P.3d 957 (2012) ..................................................................................passim
State ex. rel. Burns v. Blair,
91 Idaho 137,417 P.2d 217 (1966) ................................................................................... 38, 40

- lll -

State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian,
97 Idaho 444,546 P.2d 399 (1976)
State ex rel. Ohman v. Ivan H Talbot Family Trust,
120 Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991) ................................................................................ .47, 62
State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc.,
77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 1112 (1955) ................................................................................... 38, 40
State ex. rel. Rich v. Fonburg,
80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (1958) ..................................................................................... 38, 40
State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson,
86 Idaho 242,384 P.2d 480 (1963) ........................................................................................ .41
State ex rel. Smith v. Jardine,
130 Idaho 318,940 P.2d 1137 (1997) ........................................................................ .47, 62, 64
State, Idaho Transp. Bd. v. HI Boise, LLC,
153 Idaho 334, 282 P.3d 595 (2012) ................................................................................ .40, 41
State v. Barnes,
133 Idaho 378,987 P.2d 290 (1999) ...................................................................................... .49
State v. Burnight,
132 Idaho 654,978 P.2d 214 (1999) ....................................................................................... 25
State v. Climer,
127 Idaho 20 896 P.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1995) ...................................................................... 36, 37
State v. Schulz,
151 Idaho 863, 264 P.3d 970 (2011) ....................................................................................... 25
Telford Lands LLC v. Cain,
154 Idaho 981, 303 P.3d 1237 (2013) ..................................................................................... 63
Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
140 Idaho 416, 95 P.3d 35 (2004) ........................................................................................... 26
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr.,
151 Idaho 889,265 P.3d 502 (2011) ....................................................................................... 25

- iv -

Zimmerman v. Volkswagen ofAm., Inc.,
128 Idaho 851, 920 P.2d 67 (1996)
STATUTES

Alaska Statutes§ 09.55.3 lO(a) ...................................................................................................... 43
Alaska Statutes § 09.55.330 ........................................................................................................... 43
Idaho Code § 6-904(7) ........................................................................................................ ....passim
Idaho Code § 7-711 ............................................................................................................... .passim
Idaho Code § 7-712 ............................................................................................................... .passim
Idaho Code§ 7-718 ................................................................................................................. 63, 67
Idaho Code§ 7-721 ................................................................................................................. 32, 56
Idaho Code§ 12-121 ............................................................................................................... 63, 67
OTHER AUTHORITIES

29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 167 (2016) ................................................................................... .45
DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/construction (last visited June 6,
2016) .............................................................................................................................. 2, 29, 39
IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 14 ............................................................................................. 26, 27, 40, 54
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l) ................................................................................... 61, 62
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3) ......................................................................................... 61
LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed.)§ 822 ....................................................................................... 35
MINN. CONST. art. I,§ 13 ............................................................................................................... 26
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.03 (2015) ............................................................................ .45
OR. CONST. art. I,§ 18 ................................................................................................................... 26

W. VA. CONST. art. III,§ 9 ............................................................................................................. 26

-v-

The Plaintiff/Appellant in this case is the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD").
Defendant/Respondent is an Idaho corporation, Brooke View, Inc. doing business as The Senator
("Brooke View").

I.

INTRODUCTION

ACHD filed this action to condemn an approximately seven-foot wide strip ofland
belonging to Brooke View along South Curtis Road. The property was necessary as part of
ACHD's roadway project to improve Curtis Road and provide sidewalks for students to safely
walk to and from school (the "Project").
The district court, by its incorrect pretrial rulings, its admission of irrelevant evidence at
trial, and its erroneous instructions to the jury, transformed what should have been a straightforward condemnation action involving a partial taking of 1,425 square feet of land into an
expert laden and vigorously litigated dispute over what damages, if any, were caused during
construction of the Project. This unwarranted detour inextricably conflated condemnation and
tort law and improperly authorized the jury to award Brooke View damages never before
allowed in over one-hundred years of this Court's eminent domain jurisprudence.
Under Idaho Law, a condemnee is entitled to an award of just compensation for the
"value of the property sought to be condemned" by the condemnor, and in the context of a partial
taking, like this case, for "the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the

construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." See Idaho Code
§ 7-711. The district court's error, and this appeal, centers on the interpretation of the 12 words
of§ 7-71 l(a)(2) italicized immediately above.
These words, when read in isolation, can be interpreted one of two ways: (1) a
condemnee is entitled to damages caused during the physical acts of construction of the
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improvement; or (2) a condemnee is entitled to damages based on the existence of the
improvement in its finished condition-the structure itself-as proposed by the condemnor.

See DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse /construction (last visited June 6,
2016) ("construction" can mean either "the act or art of constructing" or "something that is
constructed; a structure"); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/construction (last visited June 6, 2016) (either "the process, art, or
manner of constructing something" or "a thing constructed").
These interpretations are mutually exclusive because a statute can only have one
meaning, and the district court adopted the former interpretation. This means that the district
court instructed the jury to award Brooke View just compensation for events, activities, and
damages allegedly sustained to its remainder parcel during the construction of Project. This
interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) was error for no fewer than seven reasons.

First, pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-712, damages under § 7-711 accrue at the date of the
summons, which as a matter of fact always predates construction. Thus damage that allegedly
accrues during construction cannot form the basis of damage under§ 7-711(2)(a).

Second, this Court has already addressed Idaho Code § § 7-711 and 7-712 as they relate to
claimed property damage to the remainder parcel during construction, and that decision is stare

decisis. In Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company v. Campbell, 34 Idaho 601,
604-05, 202 P. 1065, 1066 ( 1921) (hereafter "Campbell") this Court held that damages caused
during construction necessarily accrued long after the date of summons and thus were not
compensable as just compensation in a condemnation action. The Court said, if the condemnee
sought damages caused during construction, it would have to bring a "separate action."

Third, this Court has already specifically addressed the 12 words at issue in this case,
holding that the words "clearly authorize the landowner to introduce evidence showing the
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damage and injury that the particular improvement or structure for which the condemnation is
sought will cause to the remainder of his property." Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia
Conference ofEvangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod., 20 Idaho 568, 581, 119 P. 60, 64 (1911)
("Idaho-Western").
Fourth, other state supreme courts interpreting statutes with the very same language as

Idaho§§ 7-711 and 7-712 have concluded that damages incurred during construction by a
condemnor sound in tort, not in condemnation. See City ofAnchorage v. Scavenius, 539 P.2d
1169 (Alaska 1975); Montana R.R. Co. v. Freeser, 29 Mont. 210, 74 P. 407 (Mont. 1903).
Fifth, affirming the district court's interpretation would undermine 30 years of this

Court's rulings on attorney fees awards under the standards set forth in Ada County Highway
District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983), overruled in part by State, Dept. of
Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87,278 P.3d 957 (2012), and its progeny cases. A comparison

of a good faith market-based offer to a jury's verdict is meaningless if the jury is allowed to
consider damage incurred during construction because when the condemnor makes its Acarrequi
offer, in all likelihood, construction is not complete and the condemnor would be unable to fairly
incorporate any sums potentially attributable to such damage as part of its offer.
Sixth, the district court's reading of§ 7-71 l(a)(2) reads design immunity out of the Idaho

Tort Claims Act. Idaho Code§§ 7-711(2)(a) and 6-904(7) both address plans for the
construction of improvements-§ 7-711(2)(a) with regard to a governmental entity's proposed
improvements, and § 6-904(7) with regard to a governmental entity's plan or design for
"highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property." The Tort Claim Act is in pari
materia with§ 7-71 l(a)(2) and must be read in harmony with it, not simply ignored.
Seventh, if affirmed, the district court's ruling would lead to inconsistent results not

contemplated by Idaho's statutes, and it would have significant practical ramifications on future
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cases. Under the court's ruling, no condemnation action could be resolved before construction
was completed because any case could include damages caused during construction, yet the
condemnor would not be entitled to any defenses that it would otherwise have in a tort case.
The district court's erroneous interpretation of§ 7-71 l(a)(2) caused it to admit several
days worth of testimony and hundreds oftrial exhibits regarding events, activities, and damages
that occurred during construction. And after the presentation of all of this irrelevant evidence,
the district court instructed the jury that ACHD was responsible for all of the "construction
work" on the Project. The district court's legal conclusions, its admission of irrelevant evidence,
and its instructions to the jury are all reviewed by this Court de novo. These errors substantially
prejudiced ACHD and constitute reversible error.
The outcome of this appeal will have long and lasting impacts on the law of eminent
domain in this state and, if the district court's error is upheld, will result in a fundamental change
in the way just compensation is calculated in a condemnation action. When due consideration is
given to Idaho Code§ 7-712, the on-point case law of this Court including Campbell andldaho-

Western, the case law of other states with the same eminent domain statutes, this Court's
Acarrequi jurisprudence, another statute in pari materia, and the practical considerations in
future condemnation actions, damages allowable under Idaho Code§ 7-7I 1(2)(a) cannot include
damage caused during construction. The district court erred as a matter of law in its
interpretation ofldaho Code§ 7-711(2)(a), and its legal conclusions are properly reversed.
ACHD respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment entered by the district court
and remand this case with instructions to the district court to enter judgment in Brooke View's
favor in the amount of $8,512.32 as just compensation for the taking of its property. Moreover,
because the district court erred in its interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a), it also erred in its prevailing
party determination and in its award of attorney fees, costs as a matter of right, and discretionary
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costs to Brooke View. Accordingly, ACHD respectfully requests this Court vacate the district
court's judgment as to fees and costs and direct the district court on remand to make a finding
that ACHD is the prevailing party and entitled to its reasonable costs. Finally, ACHD is entitled
to its costs on appeal before this Court.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises out of the trial, verdict, and judgment entered by the district court,
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Judge Cheri Copsey presiding, in the condemnation action
brought by ACHD.

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

1.

ACHD Project.

In 2012, ACHD was engaged in a roadway project to improve Curtis Road between
Overland Road and Franklin Road in the city of Boise. CR 1 61, ,i 11; CR 74. The Project is
commonly referred to as ACHD's "Safe Routes to School Project on South Curtis Road, ACHD
Project No. 809028. CR 61, 74, 933.
The Project was not a typical roadway expansion project that involved the widening of
roadways to increase traffic capacity. Rather, the Project involved a "Safe Routes to School"
Project, which was designed to build sidewalks and walkways to allow students safe routes to
walk to and from schools. 2 See TT 2962-74; Ex. 1030, 1031.

1 The Clerk's Record on Appeal contains two parts. Part 1 contains the pleadings that are part of
the record on appeal and Part 2 contains the trial exhibits. Part 1, which is consecutively
paginated from 000001-006636, will be cited as "CR_". Part 2 of the Clerk's Record, which is
not paginated and contains 2296 pages of trial exhibits and published deposition transcripts, will
be referred to by trial exhibit number and cited as "Ex. _" The Trial Transcript is consecutively
paginated from 1-4224 and will be cited as "TT_".
2

The "Safe Routes to School" Program is part of ACHD's Community Programs that were
established in 2008-2009 as part of ACHD's on-going efforts to be responsive to the concerns of
citizens, neighborhoods, school districts, and cities. See TT 2962-74. The Community Programs
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In order to construct the Project, ACHD needed to acquire, through its powers of eminent
domain, a narrow strip of land belonging to Brooke View. CR 62, 75-77. The Project also
required a temporary easement to allow for the construction of the Project improvements. Id. at
62-63, 76. This action involved a partial taking.
As it related to the Brooke View property, the Project included the installation of a
concrete sidewalk, curbs, gutters, and a storm drainage/infiltration system. CR 61, ,r 11.
According to the Project plans, the infiltration trench was approximately five feet wide and
eleven feet deep and was designed to dispose of storm water drainage from the west half of
Curtis Road near the Brooke View property. CR 291-92. The Project also involved the
replacement of an irrigation pipe that was located near the entrance to Brooke View's Property
adjacent to the Curtis Road right-of-way. CR 287. The Project did not involve the widening of
any traffic lanes or the addition of any bike lanes or tum lanes on Curtis Road. CR 291, 75.
Construction work on the Project began in September 2012. CR 930,933; Ex. 30. The
portions of the Project involving the Brooke View property were completed in mid-December
2012. CR 930, 933.

2.

The Brooke View Property and the Taking.

The Brooke View property is located at 421 South Curtis Road in Boise, Ada County (the
Property"). The Property is an irregular shape with approximately 150 feet of frontage along
Curtis Road. 3 See CR 256, 2753. The Property was originally improved as a planned residential
are construction projects that are separate from ACHD's traditional roadway projects, which
focus on the specific needs of the area's local communities. See id.
3 During the case, the parties disagreed on the actual size of the Brooke View Property before
and after the taking. Compare CR 844-45, 852, 856-57, 864 (providing that the Property
consisted of 20.47 acres before the taking) with CR 1244, 1249, 1257 (providing that the
Property consisted of 18.99 acres or 18.87 acres). Ultimately, the issue was not central to the
case, since the focus of the trial centered on the damage that allegedly occurred to the Entry
Walls during construction of the Project.
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development, referred to as the "Senator Mobile Home Park," and it has transitioned over the
years from trailer homes to manufactured homes and site-built homes. CR 1158. The Property
is improved with 130 manufactured house pads and a club house. CR 256, 1159, 2739. The
Property has a masonry wall on the north boundary and the Ridenbaugh Canal on its southern
and western boundaries.
The primary dispute between the parties involved Brooke View's entry walls ("Entry
Walls") that mark the entrance to the Property off of South Curtis Road. The Entry Walls were
constructed in 2003. CR 930. The prior entry walls were removed in 2001 after they were
damaged when a car hit them. The Entry Walls and related facilities are located along Brooke
View's boundary adjacent to Curtis Road, and span the driveway entrance into the Brooke View
Property. Id. Brooke View's Entry Walls are constructed with rebar-reinforced cement footings
and a stem wall constructed of Concrete Masonry Units ("CMU") with grout and mortar.
CR 292. On top of the stem wall is an approximately seven-foot CMU wall with stucco painting
on the interior side of the walls and brick fascia applied to the South Curtis Road side of the
walls. Id.
The portion of Brooke View's Property acquired by ACHD as part of this action is 1,425
square feet (0.033 acres). CR 68-70. The temporary easement required for the construction of
the Project is 2,706 squar~ feet (0.062 acres). CR 71-73. The Property acquired by ACHD for
the Project did not include any portion of the Entry Walls or the property underneath the Entry
Walls. The Entry Walls remained in their current location and were not moved or taken as part
of the Project. 4

4

The take did require the removal of a small stub wall that was located apart from the entrance
way walls and the northern boundary wall. TT 742-43. The current appeal does not involve any
issues relating to this wall.
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During the litigation, a dispute arose between the parties over whether there was an
additional taking by ACHD beyond the 1,425 square feet described in ACHD' s Amended
Complaint. CR 1140. On February 27, 2015, the district court entered an order declaring that an
additional taking of 9.87 square feet had occurred due to the installation of project improvements
outside the original take area and that there was an additional taking of property located within
the Ridenbaugh Canal, which is owned by the Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District ("Nampa &
Meridian"). 5 See CR 3276. The parties subsequently stipulated to the size of the additional
taking within the canal and agreed that it consisted of 131.2 square feet. CR 4122-23. Thus the
total amount of the Brooke View Property that was taken as part of this action totaled 1,566.07
square feet. CR 4900. The size of the temporary construction easement did not change. Id.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

The dispute between the parties centered on whether Brooke View could seek and
recover severance damages for impacts and injury it believed was caused to its Entry Walls
during the course of construction of the Project. Brooke View argued that its Entry Walls were
in fact damaged by the Project construction activities and that the amount of just compensation
owed should include the decrease in value of the Property allegedly caused by the damage that
occurred to the Entry Walls or a sum equivalent to the cost-to-cure the damaged Entry Walls.

See, e.g., CR 6591. By contrast, ACHD argued that any damages caused by construction
activities were not properly included as part of just compensation as a matter oflaw and that
Brooke View's claim for such damages must be sought in a separate cause of action. See, e.g.,

id. Consistent with the parties' respective positions, ACHD initially offered Brooke View
$7,738 as the amount of just compensation owed, and later increased its offer to $8,512.32. Id.
5

The Ridenbaugh Canal is sometimes referred to as the Nampa & Meridian Canal. For ease of
reference and consistency, this brief will refer to the canal as the Ridenbaugh Canal.
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Brooke View rejected ACHD's offers because it believed it was owed additional amounts of
compensation due to construction activities. Id.

1.

ACHD's Amended Complaint, the Scope of the Take, and Order for
Possession.

When the parties could not agree on the amount of just compensation owed, ACHD filed
its Verified Complaint and Summons on July 11, 2012, and its Amended Complaint on
August 28, 2012. CR 31-57, 58-83, 952-53. As required by Idaho Code§ 7-712, the date of
valuation in this case is the date of the summons, which is July 11, 2012. Through its Amended
Complaint, ACHD sought "to take and condemn a portion of the Defendants' property for a
public purpose, namely, the alignment, reconstruction, and improvement of 421 S. Curtis Road,
Boise, Idaho, with said project to include placement of curbs, gutters, concrete sidewalks, and
storm drainage systems, ACHD Project No. 809028.0 (the "Construction Project")." CR 61 at

On August 7, 2012, the parties stipulated to allow ACHD to take possession of the
property required for the Project, and the district court entered its Order for Possession of Real
Property on August 23, 2012. See CR 6587. Thus, the only issue that remained for trial was the
determination of just compensation owed to Brooke View pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-711.

2.

The Pre-Trial Proceedings Spanned Nearly Three Years.

After the filing of the case in July 2012, the trial was originally set for December 16,
2013. TT 34-35, 7122. During the course of proceedings, however, the case was reset to allow
sufficient time for hearings and rulings on several motions submitted by the parties. TT 113-23.
The trial was reset for a IO-day jury trial starting on March 31, 2014. See CR 757. The trial was
again continued until April 6, 2015, to allow for ACHD to seek an interlocutory appeal after the
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district court denied its Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 6 See CR 900-02, 6593.
In its Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial dated April 11, 2014, the district court
re-opened discovery and allowed the parties to submit new expert disclosures despite the fact
that significant discovery had taken place, the parties had already disclosed their respective
expert opinions, and numerous depositions had been taken. CR 920, 932-43. ACHD objected to
the new pre-trial order and the re-start of discovery and expert disclosures because of the
significant time and expense already incurred by the parties and filed a motion to amend the
pretrial order. CR 925-28. Brooke View opposed ACHD's motion and specifically advocated
for all new expert disclosure deadlines so that the case could start anew. CR 1130-35. The
district court agreed with Brooke View and denied ACHD's motion. CR 1136-38. As a result of
the court's April 2014 Order, Brooke View made new expert disclosures with revised opinions,
and ACHD responded to the new opinions with its own supplemental disclosures. See Section
II.B.3, infra. The case proceeded to trial on April 6, 2015, the jury entered its special verdict on
April 23, 2015, and Judgment on the jury's verdict was entered on June 12, 2015. CR 4889-90,
5757-59.

3.

The Issue of Whether Brooke View Could Recover Damages for Activities
That Occurred DuringConstruction of the Project Became The Central
Focus of The Litigation.

The issue of Brooke View's claim of severance damages due to damage caused to its
Entry Walls during construction of the Project first arose in Brooke View's initial expert
disclosures in June of 2013, after the Project construction was completed. See CR 236-85; see
Ex. 30. In its disclosures, Brooke View offered expert opinions asserting that physical damage
was caused, or may be caused in the future, to the Entry Walls due to activities that occurred

A discussion of the relevant motions in the case, including ACHD's Second Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, is detailed in Section II.B.4 below.

6
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during construction, and that as a result, Brooke View was entitled to severance damages.
CR 192-204, 236-85, 2814-18. Brooke View's experts' allegations of injury caused to the Entry
Walls (or that might be caused in the future) were based upon activities that accrued nearly a
year after the date of the summons, which was July 11, 2012.
Brooke View's experts identified several potential causes of the damage to the Entry
Walls that allegedly occurred during construction of the Project, but did not identify one specific
cause for the damage. See, e.g., CR 193-94 (David O'Day), 260-62 (Roger Dunlap), 2815-17
(Richard Evans), 3153-58 (Brian Smith). The opinions of Brooke View's experts changed and
shifted throughout the course of litigation with several subsequent supplemental expert
disclosures and disclosures of entirely new experts in 2014. See, e.g., CR 1798-99, 3590-92
(David O'Day); CR 346-47, 536, 2844-46, 2852 (Richard Evans); CR 2058-63 (Rodney Boone);
CR 1973 (Dr. Paul Michaels); CR 1340-41 (Jon Pullman); CR 2175 (Patrick Dobie). Each shift
of opinion resulted in increased costs for both parties. Brooke View's experts began to narrow
their causation theories in 2014, although some experts never identified a specific causal
mechanism. See, e.g., CR 1798-99 (David O'Day); CR 1973) (Dr. Paul Michaels); CR 2175
(Patrick Dobie). Nevertheless, despite the constant revisions of its experts' opinions, none of
Brooke View's experts calculated the value of the taking or associated damages without
considering the physical construction activities during the Project. See CR 260-02, 2735, 2742,
2802-04 (Roger Dunlap); CR 254, 1167, 2593 (Mark Butler); CR 275, 3214-15 (Roger Wood);
CR 3054-55, 3106 (Mark Richey); CR 1823-32, 2595-98 (David Roylance).
Although ACHD adamantly disagreed that Brooke View's opinions that damage to the
Entry Walls that occurred during construction of the Project were proper, and although ACHD
sought to exclude those opinions through numerous motions-all of which were denied by the
district court-ACHD was forced to tailor its case to respond to Brooke View's arguments. CR
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1129 (ACHD witness list), 5375-81 (describing witness disclosures); see also ACHD's expert
reports at CR 497-98, 506 (Gordon Smith and Kenneth Colson), CR 4457-58 (Mat Fielding), CR
626-28 (Daniel Gado), CR 3895, 4063-64 (Tim Johnson).

4.

The District Court's Denial of ACHD's Second Motion for Summary
Judgment.

In response to Brooke View's expert disclosures and its claim for damages for alleged
physical damage caused, or which may be caused in the future, to the Entry Walls during the
construction of the Project, ACHD filed its Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment7 on
August 8, 2013. CR 233-35, 290-308. 8
In its Motion, ACHD argued that while Idaho Code§ 7-711 allows for just compensation
for property taken and the damages for the diminution in value caused to the remainder property,
it does not authorize compensation for alleged physical damage caused during construction of
the Project. See CR 297-302. As stated by ACHD in its briefing, such damages are not properly
part of a condemnation action but must instead be pursued in an independent action for damages
under a tort, nuisance or trespass theory. CR 298. Additionally, ACHD argued that Brooke
View's claimed damages were impermissibly speculative, improperly based upon alleged future
damages and purported physical invasion of property, and contrary to Idaho eminent domain
statutes and case law governing severance damages in condemnation actions. CR 298-306.
7

ACHD acknowledges that an appeal may not be taken from an order denying a motion for
summary judgment. Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 542, 164 P.3d 819, 822 (2007).
Consistent with Idaho case law on this issue, ACHD is not appealing from the district court's
summary judgment rulings in this case. However, ACHD is providing the procedural
background of the summary judgment motions and rulings by the district court to provide
context for the legal errors committed by the district court in this case and to demonstrate how
pervasive the issues relating to construction activities and damages alleged to have been caused
by those activities were both pretrial and at trial.
8

ACHD's first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed on June 27, 2013 sought to reduce
the scope of the trial by obtaining judgment on Requests for Admissions and is not relevant to
the issues on appeal.
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Accordingly, ACHD argued that "Brooke View has failed to plead a viable claim for damages to
the Wall and summary judgment upon that claim is necessary and appropriate." CR 306.
The district court held a hearing on ACHD's Second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on September 12, 2013. TT 39-129. The district court concluded that there were
genuine issues of material fact that precluded granting ACHD's Motion. TT 104. The district
court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing on the issue of whether there had been an
additional taking of Brooke View's Property or property interests-specifically whether there
had been a taking of lateral support from the Property. TT 106-07. The district court
subsequently denied ACHD's Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in a single-page
Order that did not contain any written analysis. CR 594-95.

5.

The District Court's Denial of ACHD's Motion for Reconsideration of
Second Motion for Summary Judgment and ACHD's Third Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Following the district court's denial, ACHD filed a Motion for Reconsideration of its
Second Motion for Summary Judgment (CR 665-67) and a Third Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (CR 662-64). Both Motions were supported by a single Memorandum. CR 668-89.
In its supporting Memorandum, ACHD provided the information requested by the court on the
issue of lateral support, noting that Brooke View had not asserted any claim for inverse
condemnation based upon the taking of its lateral support and that it had not disclosed any expert
opinions to support such a takings claim. CR 671-76. Additionally, ACHD requested
clarification of the grounds for the district court's denial of ACHD's Second Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and again requested the court grant partial summary judgment against
Brooke View on its damage theory of recovery based upon alleged physical damage caused
during construction of ACHD's Project. CR 663, 669-70, 678-86. ACHD argued that such
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'

damages must be raised in claims brought in tort and were not compensable in a condemnation
action. CR 682.
The district court heard argument on ACHD's Motion for Reconsideration and its Third
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in November 2013. TT 130-208. During the hearing, the
district court addressed the issue of the interpretation ofldaho Code§ 7-711(2)(a) and held that
the statute should be interpreted to include damages for "things that flow from the construction
of the improvement as proposed by the plaintiff." TT 170-71; see also TT 178. Under the
district court's interpretation, severance damages in a condemnation action included damages
caused during construction of the Project.
The district court entered a single page Order Denying ACHD's Motion for
Reconsideration of its Second Motion for Summary Judgment without written analysis. CR 76768. It also entered a two-page Order Denying ACHD's Third Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, again without further written analysis. See CR 761-63.
In its Order Denying ACHD's Third Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the district
court held that Brooke View's assertion that ACHD's Project "caused physical damage to the
entrance way walls on the remaining Brooke Niew (sic) property, via underground water
trespass, vibration, or taking of lateral support, are encompassed within and a part of the ACHD
eminent domain claim and no counterclaim or affirmative defense must be pled by the
Defendants, Brooke View, Inc. to assert the same." CR 762. The district court also held that
although Brooke View had the burden to prove that construction of the improvement caused
physical damage to the Entry Walls on the Brooke View Property, "Brooke View, Inc. is not
required to prove the specific mechanism of how the Brooke View entrance way walls were
allegedly physically damaged, but rather simply construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by Plaintiff pursuant to the Project was the cause of the alleged physical damage." Id.
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This legal determination by the court unqualifiedly put at issue the alleged damage to the Entry
Walls that occurred during construction.

6.

This Court's Denial of ACHD's Request for Interlocutory Appeal.

Believing the district court's holdings to be in error, on December 3, 2013, ii~CHD filed a
Motion for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Orders. In its Motion, ACHD requested this
Court consider"[w]hether causes of action normally classified as tort, nuisance, trespass or other
claims are encompassed within an eminent domain claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-711." The
district court granted ACHD's motion. CR 900-02. This Court, however, declined to hear
ACHD's request for interlocutory appeal and the litigation proceeded before the district court.

7.

The District Court's Denial of ACHD's Fourth Motion for Summary
Judgment.

In December 2014, ACHD filed its Fourth Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, or, in
the Alternative, Motion in Limine. CR 1302-07. 9 In its Motion, ACHD requested summary
judgment on Brooke View's allegations of property damage on the grounds that Brooke View's
claimed damages incurred during construction of the Project, were not recoverable in a
condemnation action, and that Brooke View's disclosed expert opinions were remote and
speculative, lacked the foundational requirements for expert opinion testimony, failed to
establish the requisite causal connection, and were unsubstantiated by the facts. See CR 137475, 1379-85. ACHD also argued that summary judgment was proper because of the immunity
9 Brooke View also filed its own motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of the width
of the Nampa & Meridian easement along the Ridenbaugh Canal, the setback requirements for
Brooke View's entrance walls, whether a permit could have been obtained for the walls, whether
an additional taking had occurred by ACHD, and whether ACHD's appraiser's valuation
methodologies were in compliance with Idaho Code § 7-711. CR 1139-41. The district court
granted Brooke View's motion. See CR 3276-77, 3303-04, 3306. Subsequently, the parties
entered into a stipulation wherein they agreed upon the size of the additional taking, and the
court accepted the parties' stipulation. CR 4121-23.
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protections set forth in Idaho Code § 6-904(7), relating to plans or designs "for construction or
improvement to the highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property," which precluded
Brooke View from recovering damages for its allegations of physical property damage incurred
during construction. CR 1386-88.
The district court heard argument on ACHD's Fourth Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on February 12, 2015 and entered its Order denying ACHD's Motion on February 26,
2015. See CR 3281-84. The Court held, "[t]his is a constitutional claim, not a tort claim, and
tort principles do not apply." CR 3282. The Court also held that Brooke View had to prove that
damages were caused during construction, but that it did not have to prove proximate cause or
the mechanism of damage. Id. According to the district court, it was not Brooke View's burden
to "figure out who did what in relation to the project which necessitated the taking." Id.
Therefore, "[w]hether there is evidence the damage done to Brooke View by [the local water
utility] and its contractor may have been one or the only cause of damage is irrelevant" and "[a]ll
Brooke View needs to do is show it is the construction of this project that caused damage; the
project including all ofits ramifications." Id. The district court also made the following
conclusion about Idaho's eminent domain laws: "The way we determine how much
compensation is paid is by the change in value to the property, which in Idaho includes change
from construction of the project in the manner proposed." CR 3282-83.
Based upon these rulings, the district court granted summary judgment in Brooke View's
favor-as the non-moving party-concluding that ACHD was responsible to Brooke View for
property damage caused during the construction of the Project, even if others were "the only
cause of damage." See id. The district court also held that the immunity for "a plan or design for
construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property"
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set forth in Idaho Code § 6-904(7) is inapplicable to Brooke View's allegations of physical
property damage to the remainder property during construction. See CR 3283.

8.

ACHD's Settlement Offers And Attempts to Resolve The Case Before Trial.

ACHD made nu...rnerous attempts to settle this case before trial. In May 2013, i1.._CHD
offered Brooke View $45,000. CR 5919. On January 6, 2015, ACHD significantly increased its
settlement offer and pursuant to requirements of Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 and
its subsequent cases, ACHD made a new offer at $204,600 and then subsequently at $257,000 on
January 13, 2015. CR 5882-83. Brooke View rejected the first offer on January 6th and later
countered the January 13th offer with an offer in excess of $300,000. CR 5921. Brooke View
clarified three days later that its offer was actually more than $670,000. CR 5901-02, 5921. On
January 25, 2015, ACHD sent Brooke View a settlement offer of$275,000. CR 5883, 5922.
Brooke View rejected this offer without any counter-proposals and expressed a desire to cease
settlement negotiations entirely. CR 5882-83, 5905. As a result of the failed settlement
attempts, the parties proceeded to trial.

9.

The Trial and Jury Instructions.

The trial in this case began on April 6, 2015. Consistent with its pretrial rulings, at trial
the district court again concluded that Idaho Code§ 7-71 l(a)(2) permitted Brooke View to
recover damages for impacts and injury caused during construction of the Project. For example,
during trial, the district court noted how the issue of the compensability of the damages caused
during construction kept coming up "over and over again." TT 2508. The court stated,
that portion that we're dealing with the construction -- the damage
allegedly caused by construction -- and I'm saying allegedly -- it
hasn't been determined yet, the jury's going to make that
determination -- is not a tort action. That's what has caused much
of the frustration that I feel. I think sometimes we have constantly
gone back to the same issue over and over again.
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2508-09. The court went on to chastise ACHD stating that,
[t]o some extent ACHD has some difficulty in understanding that
this is - the damage issue is not a negligence issue. Period. Not. I
don't know how many times I have to say that. It is simply was
there damage caused.

Id. The district court then "urge[d] ACHD to go back and read the statute" (referencing§ 7711(2)(a)) and made the following ruling:
The statute is clear and unambiguous. They are entitled to
damages, I would call traditional severance damages, and for any
damages caused by the construction. It says that. We have gone
over that repeatedly. It is not unusual.
Id. (emphasis added).

The court reiterated its legal conclusion as to the measure of damages that could be
recovered by Brooke View by stating:
THE COURT: Here's the deal, Counsel. Everyone here is
forgetting either damage was caused by the construction or it
wasn 't. If it was, then she is entitled to compensation for that
damage. This is an eminent domain case. This is not a negligence
case. And I think the parties keep veering off into negligence
concepts and it is not a negligence case.
TT 3271-73 (emphasis added). ACHD attempted to explain its disagreement with the ruling, but
was cut off by the court before a full explanation could be provided.
MS. JUDD: Your Honor, fortunately in most of their case in chief
it was about duty of ACHD and they should have done a
preconstruction survey, why didn't they do a preconstruction
survey, and it was setting the stage for all of the things they claim
ACHDTHE COURT: Can I -- before you go down that path very far.
That's not why they were doing it. The reason they were doing it is
to establish that ACHD had the opportunity to design this project
so that -- assuming they prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that, in fact, this construction caused the damage -- and I'm not the
fact finder. The reason they bring that in is to show that it could
have been designed differently and that ACHD had the opportunity
to design it differently. It is not because they're saying you had a
duty of some sort. You're getting hung up on tort concepts. This is
not a tort case.
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I don't know how many times to say this is not a tort case. You
need to either prove it didn 't damage or it did. One or the other.
Not they have to prove that it damaged. Once they prove that, then
it's just a question of valuation. There's no way that they could
have mitigated the damage that you did, if you did it. And I'm
making that clear. Every time I say "you did," there's the caveat: I
don't know. That's going to be up for the jury to decide that.
TT 3271-73 (emphasis added).
Consistent with the district court's legal conclusions as to the interpretation of Idaho's
severance damage statute, the Court extended its rulings at trial to declare that ACHD was
responsible for all aspects of the Project, including all damages resulting from the physical
construction during the Project. The district court's legal rulings on this issue were made
throughout trial, further communicating to the jury that damages occurring during construction
of the Project were ACHD's responsibility and that Brooke View could recover such damages:
THE COURT: Number one, I'm not going to give any of these
questions. I'm going to tell them I'm not giving these questions
because this is ACHD 's project and it is legally responsible for its
project.
TT 3344-45 (emphasis added). 10 The court then told the jury,
THE COURT: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for
being so prompt. Ladies and gentlemen, I have gone through all of
these jury questions and a couple things. I'm not actually going to
give any of them for a couple of reasons. First, this is ACHD's
project and it is legally responsible for its project. So any
questions relating to responsibility are not relevant.
10 After the district court declared its ruling as to ACHD being legally responsible for the Project,
the court asked the parties if there was anything about the statement that does not accurately state
the legal rule. TT 3344-45. In response, counsel for Brooke View agreed. Counsel for ACHD,
however, merely stated "That's fine, Your Honor." ACHD did not agree with the court's ruling
but rather merely acknowledged that the court was intent on its conclusion and that it would be
informing the jury of its determination. ACHD renewed its objections to the court's ruling
during the jury instruction conference in which it objected to Jury Instruction No. 27, which
paralleled the court's ruling. See TT 3998-4000 (ACHD's objection to Jury Instruction No. 27,
which is consistent with the court's ruling, stated "[f]or purposes of your decision you are to
assume ACHD is responsible for all construction work performed as part of the Curtis Road
Project.").
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3347 (emphasis added).
Based upon its legal rulings made during trial, Brooke View was permitted to present
evidence to the jury of the work and related activities that took place during construction of the
Project. This evidence was permitted despite the court's statements that this was not a tort case.
See, e.g., TT 3271-73. The parties called 35 witnesses during trial, and more than one-third of
those witnesses testified at length about the construction of ACHD's Project and how that
construction damaged the Entry Walls, resulting in hundreds of pages of testimony. See, e.g., TT
1946 ("I think that the damage to the wall is a direct result of the ACHD construction project."
Patrick Dobie); TT 1560 (same, Richard Evans); TT 1703 (same, David O'Day); TT 2092-93
(same, Dr. Paul Michaels); TT 2235-36 (same, Brian Smith); TT 941-45 (describing progress of
construction activities, Rodney Boone); TT 1682-86, 1695-96 (same, David O'Day); TT 1904-08
(same, Patrick Dobie); TT 3057-63 (same, Diane Miller); TT 3253-57, 3280-318 (same, Sam
Howell); TT 3351-67 (same, Chris Hawkins); TT 3495-500 (same, Dan Gado); TT 1014-49
(describing progress of construction and personal observations of cracks in the Entry Walls, John
Guerrero); TT 1052-62. (same, Robert Ware). A detailed listing of the witnesses and their
testimony is attached to this Brief as Addendum A
Additionally, at least 181 of the 301 exhibits admitted at trial were solely directed at
establishing the fact of and scope of damage that occurred during construction. This evidence
included 66 exhibits containing more than 400 photographs of hundreds of cracks in the Entry
Walls that allegedly appeared during construction. A complete listing of the exhibits admitted at
trial that fall in this category is attached to this Brief as Addendum B.
In addition to the evidence of damage purportedly caused during construction, Brooke
View was also permitted to put on substantial evidence of the negligence of ACHD and its
contractors in its design, preparation and construction activities-again, this evidence was
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permitted despite the court's rulings that the case did not involve a tort claim and that "tort
principles do not apply." CR 3282. For example, Patrick Dobie identified six separate actions
ACHD should have taken in order to protect the Entry Walls. TT 1859, 1868, 1896-97, 1943-45,
1977-78. David O'Day identified seven ways ACHD should have protected the Entry Walls
priortoandduringconstruction. TT 1580, 1583, 1585-86, 1709-10, 1809-12. Brooke View
elicited similar opinions from Rodney Boone (TT 946-47), Richard Evans (TT 1476), and
Dr. Paul Michaels (TT 2008, 2139-40). Based upon Brooke View's evidence, all of its valuation
witnesses included as part of their conclusions of just compensation, severance damages based
upon damage caused during construction of the Project. CR 5473 (Roger Dunlap), 5503 (Mark
Richey), 5549 (Richard Evans); TT 2625-30 (Mark Richey), 2707-10 (Roger Dunlap), 2819-20
(Richard Evans).
In its case, ACHD presented witnesses who responded to Brooke View's claims of

damages caused during construction. TT 3497-500, 3524-28, 3535, 3543, 3562, 3571-72, 357981, 3588-89, 3592-93, 3596-97, 3618 (Daniel Gado); 3651-53, 3667, 3669-70, 3710-11, 3746
(Tim Johnson). However, because it maintained that such evidence was irrelevant and not
compensable in a condemnation action, it did not put on valuation evidence and instead ACHD
conceded that Brooke View was entitled to just compensation in the amount of $8,512.32 (CR
4901)----a sum which did not include any severance damages for the activities or damages that
occurred during construction of the Project.
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the district court gave the following
jury instructions directing the jury to award Brooke View damages without proof of causation
and imposing strict liability on ACHD for all damages purportedly caused to the Entry Walls
during construction of the Project:

- 21 -

•
Jury Instruction No. 15 - "Just compensation means the fair
market value of the property taken, including all permanent
improvements thereon together with any direct damages suffered by
Brooke View as a result of the taking or construction of the
improvement project in the manner proposed by ACHD, all measured
as of July 11, 2012." CR 4906 (emphasis added).
•
Jury Instruction No. 20 - "In this case, Brooke View claims
the taking and the construction of the ACHD improvement project in
the manner proposed by ACHD caused its remaining land to decrease
in market value. Brooke View has the burden of proving construction
of the ACHD improvement project in the manner proposed by ACHD
caused damage to its property or improvements on that property.
Brooke View does not have to prove the mechanism for how such
damage, if any, occurred. Ifyou find Brooke View has met its burden
ofproof, Brooke View is entitled to the lesser of the decrease in the
market value of the remaining property or the cost to cure any proven
damages, but not both. Cost to cure is the amount required to restore
the property to the condition it was in before it was damaged." CR
4911 (emphasis added).
•
Jury Instruction No. 24 - "There has been evidence Brooke
View did not notify ACHD at the time it claims it discovered
cracks on its walls on or about November 1, 2012. This issue has
been the subject of prior rulings by this Court and the Court ruled
that this fact has no relevancy to any issue to be decided by you.
Therefore, you are instructed that you are not to consider this fact
in arriving at your decision or to discuss it in deliberations." CR
4915 (emphasis added).
•
Jury Instruction No. 27 - "For purposes of your decision
you are to assume A CHD is responsible for all construction work
performed as part of the Curtis Road Project." CR 4918
(emphasis added).

10.

The Jury's Verdict and Entry of Judgment.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of $146,291.68. CR
4889-90. The jury's verdict consisted of the following: $3,915.18 for the fair market value of
the property taken; $676.50 for the fair market value of the temporary easement; $700.00 for the
value of the 16.547 square feet of improvements taken; and $141,000 for the cost to cure the
severance damages. Id. The jury also determined that Brooke View was entitled to $257,836.16
in severance damages. Id. However, because Brooke View is only entitled to recover the lesser
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of severance damages or the cost-to-cure amount, the jury awarded Brooke View $141,000
instead of the larger severance damage amount. 11 Id.
On June 12, 2015, the district court entered Judgment on the Verdict in the amount of
$148,390.21, which consisted of$146,291.68 awarded by the jury and an additur of$2,098.53 in
order to increase the jury's award to the assessed value of the Property. CR 5758. Additionally,
the district court awarded prejudgment interest from July 11, 2012 through June 11, 2015 in the
amount of $48,792.66, which sum would continue to accrue in the amount of $46.24 per day
until the Judgment was paid. Id. The Judgment was satisfied by ACHD upon the Court's release
of the funds on deposit with the Court. CR 6227-28.

11.

The District Court's Award of Attorney Fees and Costs to Brooke View.

The court concluded that Brooke View was the prevailing party and awarded attorney
fees in the amount of $744,243.56, costs as a matter of right in the amount of $44,051.46, and
discretionary costs in the amount of$365,703.63 for a total award of$1,151,699.99. CR
6616. ACHD timely filed an amended notice of appeal on July 24, 2015. CR 6565.

III.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Where Idaho's eminent domain statutes and case law limit severance damage

awards in a partial taking case to damages to the remainder property that accrue as of the date of
the summons for "the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff,"
did the district court err in:
a.

its legal conclusions during pretrial, and in its instructions to the jury at

trial, holding that Idaho law allows an award of just compensation for physical damage

11

For consistency and ease of reference, ACHD will refer to "severance damages" as a general
term that also includes the cost-to-cure amount that can off-set severance damages.
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allegedly caused to the remainder property for all work performed during the
construction of the Project for which the taking was required;
b.

admitting testimony and other evidence of events and activities that

occurred after the date of the summons and during the construction of the Project for
which the taking was required;
c.

admitting testimony and other evidence of physical damage to the

remainder property that accrued after the date of the summons and that was allegedly
caused by work performed during the construction of the Project for which the taking
was required.
2.

Did the district court err as a matter oflaw in determining Brooke View to be the

prevailing party and awarding Brooke View attorney fees, cost as a matter of right, and
discretionary costs.
3.

Did the district court err as a matter oflaw in failing to conclude that ACHD was

the prevailing party and denying ACHD its costs.
4.

Is ACHD the prevailing party on appeal and entitled to an award of its costs on

appeal.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The central issues on appeal involve: (1) the district court's erroneous interpretation of
Idaho's eminent domain statutes governing the award of severance damages owed to Brooke
View; (2) the district court's error in admitting evidence regarding activities, events, and damage
allegedly caused during construction of the Project; and (3) the district court's improper
instructions to the jury based on its flawed statutory interpretation.
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The [i]nterpretation of a statute is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises free
review." Grathol, 153 Idaho at 91,278 P.3d at 961. "Judicial interpretation of a statute begins
with an examination of the statute's literal words." (citing State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659,
978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999)). This Court interprets statutes "according to their plain, express
meaning, and resorts to judicial construction only if the statute is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd,
or arguably in conflict with other laws." Id. (citing Arel v. T & L Enter., Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32,
189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008)).
The starting point for interpreting statutes "begin[s] with the literal words of the statute;
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d
502,506 (2011). "A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one
reasonable construction." Id. at 896,265 P.3d at 509 (quoting Porter v. Bd. of Tr., Preston Sch.
Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671,674 (2004)). Where statutory language is
ambiguous this Court will "look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the
reasonableness of proposed interpretations." Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226,231, 31 P.3d 248,
253 (2001 ). "The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative
body that adopted the act." State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866,264 P.3d 970,973 (2011)
(quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,310,208 P.3d 289,292 (2009)). Thus,
"the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be
void, superfluous, or redundant." Id.
Decisions regarding the admission of evidence at trial are subject to an abuse of
discretion standard. See Mac Tools, Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 199, 879 P.2d 1126, 1132
(1994). "However, the question of relevancy under I.R.E. 402 is not a discretionary matter
because there is no issue of credibility or finding of fact for the trial court to resolve prior to
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deciding whether to admit the evidence." Id. "Thus, this Court reviews the trial court's
relevancy decisions under the de nova standard of review." Id. (citing Lubcke v. Boise City Ada

Cty. Housing Auth., 124 Idaho 450,466, 860 P.2d 653, 669 (1993)).
The question of whether the jury was properly instructed is also subject to free review.

Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 701, 116 P.3d 27, 31 (2005) (quoting Vendelin v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,432, 95 P.3d 35, 50 (2004)). "The standard ofreview for
issues concerning jury instructions is limited to a determination whether the instructions, as a
whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law." Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale

Corp., 140 Idaho 416,432, 95 P.3d 34, 50 (2004).

B.

THE RIGHT TO SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN AN IDAHO CONDEMNATION ACTION ARISES
FROM IDAHO CODE § 7-711.

Under Idaho's Constitution, a landowner is entitled to compensation when property is
"taken" for public use. IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 14. Idaho's eminent domain provision states that
"[p ]rivate property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefore." Id.
Idaho's Constitution is one of the majority of states whose constitutions provide for
compensation only when property is "taken," as opposed to the minority of states whose
constitutions permit compensation when property is taken and when property is merely
"damaged." Compare IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 14 (requires compensation for taking of private
property) and OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 (requires compensation for taking of private property), with
MINN. CONST. art. I,§ 13 (requires compensation for taking, destruction or damage caused to
private property); W. VA. CONST. art. III,§ 9 (requires compensation for taking or damage
caused to private property).
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The Idaho Supreme Court discussed the significance of Idaho's constitutional limitation
onjust compensation awards in Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 60. In that case, the
Supreme Court discussed at length Idaho's "take" constitution and explained that "the
Constitution of this state provides simply for the payment of 'a just compensation' for the
'taldng' of private property, and does not require the payment for damages sustained." Id. at

583, 119 P. at 65. The Court noted that "[t]he omission of the damage clause is significant":
And when the convention in Idaho framed the Constitution of that
state, omitting such clause, and it was so adopted, the conclusion
must be that the omission was deliberate and because the people of
that state believed that, owing to the conditions there existing, the
public interests demanded that the additional burden ofpaying
consequential damages should not be imposed on those taldng
property for public uses. And there is nothing in the Idaho
constitution requiring compensation except for the taking of
property.
Id. at 584, 119 P. at 65 (emphasis added).

The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho-Western went on to explain that "the omission of the
words 'or damaged' from the constitution does not prevent the legislature from imposing a
condition to that effect by statutory enactment[,]" and it observed that the Idaho Legislature had
in fact enacted legislation authorizing awards of severance damages. Id. at 5 85, 119 P. at 65
(citing Section 5220 of the Revised Codes).
Section 5220 of the Revised Code referred to in the Idaho-Western case is substantively
identical to Idaho Code § 7-711-the current Idaho Code that establishes the statutory
mechanism for determining just compensation awards, including severance damages. Thus,
where the present dispute is over the permissible scope of Brooke View's severance damage
award, this appeal turns on the language of § 7-711 and the district court's interpretation of, and
legal conclusions regarding, the language of that statute.
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The relevant portions of Idaho Code § 7-711 provide that for the assessment of severance
damages in a condemnation action,
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon
must ascertain and assess:
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and
every separate estate or interest therein; if it consists of different
parcels, the value of each parcel and each estate or interest therein
shall be separately assessed. For purposes of ascertaining the value
of the property, the minimum amount for damages shall be the
greater of the assessed value for property tax purposes unless the
court, jury or referee finds the property has been altered
substantially, or the plaintiffs highest prelitigation appraisal.
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part
of a larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion
not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; and (b) the
damages to any business qualifying under this subsection having
more than five (5) years' standing which the taking of a portion of
the property and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff may reasonably cause.
Idaho Code § 7-711. Thus, under this statute a landowner who is subject to a condemnation
action involving a partial taking of property, such as in the present case, is entitled to just
compensation that consists of (1) the value of the property taken, and (2) damages "which will
accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion
sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff." Id. 12 This appeal centers on the phrase "the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff' and whether the district court properly interpreted the phrase

12

A landowner may also be entitled to business damages. Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(b). However,
Brooke View did not claim business damages in this case and therefore, the business damage
provision of§ 7-711 is not at issue on appeal. CR 178.
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to allow a claim for severance damages to the remainder property that allegedly occurred during
construction of the Project.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION As To THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 7-711.

The district court concluded that the pl1rase "the constru~ction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff' within§ 7-711(2)(a) refers to activities, and the consequences
of such activities, that occurred during Project construction. See discussion of the district court's
rulings in Sections III.B.4-11, supra. The district court's conclusions were based upon a narrow
reading of this specific clause, to the exclusion of the remainder of the statute and the other
applicable eminent domain provisions. The court's limited focus resulted in an erroneous
interpretation of the statute, irrelevant evidence being presented to the jury at trial, improper
instructions being given to the jury, and the improper inclusion of non-compensable damages in
Brooke View's award of just compensation. See discussion of evidence admitted at trial and
instructions given to the jury in Section III.B.10, supra; see also Addendum A, B.
ACHD acknowledges that these 12 words of 7-711 (2)(a) if read in isolation could result
in two equally reasonable and conflicting interpretations----one where the term "construction"
means the physical act or process of constructing something and the other where it means the
structure or thing that is constructed. See DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse
/construction (last visited June 6, 2016) ("construction" can mean either "the act or art of
constructing" or "something that is constructed; a structure"); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER
Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/construction (last visited June 6,
2016) (either "the process, art, or manner of constructing something" or "a thing constructed").
However, when the statute is read as whole, within the context ofldaho's entire statutory
framework, and consistent with long-standing Idaho case law, the district court's interpretation is
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'

'

unreasonable and contrary to law, and its admission of evidence based upon its erroneous legal
conclusions constituted reversible error. 13 As properly interpreted, damages caused during
construction are not recoverable as severance damages in a condemnation action.

1.

The District Court's Erroneous Interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) is Contrary
to Well-established Standards for Determining Severance Damages in
Condemnation Actions and is Directly Contrary to the Requirements of
§ 7-712.

The district court's conclusion that Brooke View could seek, and eventually recover,
severance damages for physical injury or damage caused to its Entry Walls during construction
of the Project is contrary to the established standards for determining severance damages, and it
effectively invalidates the requirements Idaho Code§ 7-712. Such an interpretation is clear
error.
Idaho Code § 7-712 provides that the determination of just compensation and severance
damages must be made as of the date of the summons. See Idaho Code § 7-712. The express
language of§ 7-712 provides:
[f]or the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right
thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the
summons, and its actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of
compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of
damage to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in
all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last
section.
During the proceedings before the district court, ACHD argued that the language of§ 7711(2)(a) was unambiguous in that Idaho's eminent domain statute read as a whole does not
allow for the recovery of damages alleged to have accrued during construction. See CR 29899. The district court disagreed with ACHD's interpretation, concluding that the language of
§ 7-711(2)(a) allowed Brooke View to recover severance damages for activities, events, and
damages that occurred during construction of ACHD's project. See CR 6591, n.3. It remains
ACHD's position that the statute is unambiguous because the district court's interpretation is
unreasonable and inconsistent with Idaho's eminent domain statute and this Court's body of case
law as a whole. However, ACHD does acknowledge that there are two competing interpretations
before the Court, such that canons of statutory construction may be useful tools for this Court in
determining the meaning of§ 7-711(2)(a).
13
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Idaho Code § 7-712 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that this statute
means what it says. State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 449-50, 546 P.2d 399, 404-05
(1976) ("In Idaho, the value of the property actually taken in an eminent domain proceeding and
the damages which will accrue to the remaining property by reason of the severance are
computed as of the date of the issuance of the summons, not the date that the property is actually
taken."); Lobdell v. State ex rel. Bd. of Highway Dirs., 89 Idaho 559,566,407 P.2d 135, 139
( 1965) ("I.C. § 7-712 provides that the time for assessment of damages in an ordinary
condemnation action is to be determined as of the date of the summons.").
There is no discretion permitted by§ 7-712; rather, the language of the statute speaks in
mandatory terms requiring that damages "shall be deemed to have accrued" as of the date of the
summons and the value of the property as of the date of summons "shall be the measure of
compensation." Idaho Code§ 7-712 (emphasis added). Similarly,§ 7-712 also provides that
"[t]he compensation and damages awarded shall draw lawful interest from the date of the
summons." Id. (emphasis added). In clear mandatory language, this statutory scheme
establishes the date of the summons as the date for determining just compensation including
severance damage. 14

14

Idaho's statutory requirement that property must be valued as of the date of the summons is set
forth in the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions. See IDJI2d 7.05, 7.05.1, 7.05.5, 7.07, 7.16, and 7.18.
Idaho's jury instructions provide that "[J]ust compensation means the fair market value of the
property taken, measured as of [date]." IDJI2d 7.05. Subsection 7.05.1 states, "Just
compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, including all permanent
improvements thereon, measured as of [date]." IDJI2d 7 .05.1. Additionally, for partial takings,
like in the present case, Idaho's jury instructions provide that "[j]ust compensation means the fair
market value of the property taken, including all permanent improvements thereon, together with
any direct damages suffered by the defendant, all measured as of [date]." IDJI2d 7.05.5; see id.,
comments ("In a direct condemnation action, the date inserted in the instruction will be the date
of issuance of the summons - LC.§ 7-712."); 1DJI2d 7.07 (fair market value determination to be
assessed as of date of summons, as required by I. C. § 7-712); IDJI2d 7 .16 (Just compensation is
to be determined based upon before-and-after valuation, measured as of date of summons).
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Moreover, § 7-711 cannot be read in isolation without § 7-712, as the district court did in
its interpretation. Idaho Code§ 7-712 must be read together with§ 7-711 because§ 7-712
provides specific requirements as to the manner in which severance damages must be calculated,
and it specifically cross-references § 7-712. Thus a reading of one statute without the other
results in an incomplete, and inaccurate, interpretation ofldaho's requirements for severance
damage awards.
Reading the two statutes together leads to the logical conclusion that severance damages
under§ 7-711 cannot include damages caused during the construction of the project because in
condemnation actions, the summons always comes before the construction of the improvement.
This is so because the complaint and summons are filed before the condemnor may take
possession of the property required for the public project and begin construction. Idaho Code
§ 7-721 (providing that condemnor may seek lawful possession of the property being condemned
"[ a ]t any time after an action for condemnation has been commenced under the provisions of this
chapter and after the defendant has made an appearance"). Further support of this interpretation
comes from the plain language of§ 7-711(2)(a), which uses the phase "in the manner proposed
by the plaintiff," and not "in the manner constructed" or "in the manner built." Thus, to give full
meaning to both§ 7-711(2)(a) and§ 7-712, the proper interpretation must be that evidence of
actual construction activities that occur after the date of summons may not be considered as part
of severance damages. To conclude otherwise would undermine the entire framework for
severance damage awards in condemnation actions and invalidate the requirements of§ 7711(2)(a) and§ 7-712.
Additionally, words in one place in a statute usually have the same meaning in every
other place in the statute. St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd v. Bd. of Cty. Comm 'rs of
Gooding Cty., 149 Idaho 584,589,237 P.3d 1210, 1215 (2010). In§ 7-711, the same language
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"the construction of the improvement proposed by plaintiff' appears in subsection (3) of the
statute. That portion of the statute addresses special benefits that the taking may have on the
remainder parcel. There is no conceivable way that the acts of construction and the disruption,
dust, and inconvenience that construction work typically brings would somehow benefit the
remainder property. Thus, the word "construction" must mean the existence of the improvement
or the structure as proposed by the condemnor, because that is what could result in a benefit to
the remainder parcel-not the construction work required to build the improvement. Carrying
the argument to its logical conclusion, if the term "construction" means the existence of the
improvement or structure in subsection (3) of§ 7-711, then it must also have the same meaning
in subsection (2)(a).
The district court's ruling to the contrary, which allowed Brooke View to present
evidence of, and recover severance damages for, activities that occurred after the date of the
summons and during construction and during construction, is in direct conflict with the plain
language of the statute read as a whole. The district court erred as a matter of law in its
interpretation ofldaho Code § 7-711 (2)(a), and ACHD respectfully requests this Court reverse
that error.

2.

The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7-711 is Contrary to Long-Standing
Idaho Case Law That Precludes Severance Damages for Impacts or Damage
Occurring During Construction.

In addition to being contrary to the plain language of§§ 7-711 and 7-712, the district
court's interpretation of§ 7-7I l(a)(2) also runs afoul oflong-standing Idaho case law
interpreting these very provisions. E.g., Campbell, 34 Idaho at 604-05, 202 P. at 1066 (holding
that damages caused during construction of respondent's railroad accrued long after the date of
summons were not compensable in the condemnation action but "could be recovered only in a
separate action"); Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 581, 585-86, 119 P. at 64, 66 (affirming a
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severance damage award for the impact the existence of the specific improvement proposed by
the condernnor-a rail line-had on the remainder property, not for the acts the condernnor or its
agents undertook during construction of the rail line).

a.

The Case of Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company v.
Campbell Precludes Severance Damage Awards for Construction
Activities that Take Place After the Date of Summons.

The Campbell case is squarely on point with this case and further demonstrates that the
district court's legal conclusions as to the permissible scope of damages under§ 7-711(2)(a)
were in error. 34 Idaho 601,202 P. 1065. In Campbell, the Oregon-Washington Railroad &
Navigation Company ("Railroad") filed a condemnation action against the Campbells to
condemn a right of way through their property. Id. at 603, 202 P. at 1065. The Campbells
sought compensation for the value ofland taken as well as severance damages for lands not
taken. Id. Based upon an application by the Railroad, the district court appointed a commission
to determine the amount of just compensation owed to the Campbells. Id. The Commission
issued its decision, but the Railroad refused to accept it. Id. Instead, the Railroad deposited the
amount determined by the commission into the district court so that it could take possession of
the property and move forward with construction. Id. After the railroad had been constructed
across the Campbells' land, a jury was impaneled, and the case tried. The jury returned a verdict
awarding compensation for the land taken but no award of severance damages for the remainder
property. Id., 202 P. at 1066. The Campbells appealed.
On appeal, the Campbells argued was that the district court committed error in rejecting
the Campbells' proffer to prove certain damages to the remainder property caused by the actual
construction of the railroad. Id. at 604,202 P. at 1066. They claimed that the construction
activities released hazardous materials poisoning a creek running through their property. Id.
Addressing this argument, the court reviewed and applied the then applicable condemnation
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statutes as to severance damages-statutes that share the same language as §§ 7-711 (2)(a) and
§ 7-712.
First, the court quoted the relevant portion of C.S. § 7414, which is identical to the
relevant portions of§ 7-711 (1 )(a) at issue in the present case, observing that "the jury was
required to ascertain and assess the damages accruing 'to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Id. The court then
quoted the relevant portion of C.S. § 7415, which is identical to the current§ 7-712. Applying
these two statutes, the court held that the damages complained of "accrued long after the date of
the issuance of summons, and were not damages which, at that date, could have been anticipated
as a result of the construction ofrespondent' s railroad, and therefore were not deemed by law to
have accrued at that date." Id. at 605,202 P. 1066 (citing LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed.)
§ 822). The court therefore concluded that if respondent was liable for the poisoning of
Campbell's stream caused by the construction of the railroad project, such damages "could be
recovered only in a separate action." Id. The court's decision in Campbell is binding precedent
that damages that accrue during construction and after the date of summons are not recoverable
in a condemnation action.
The Campbell case has significant similarities to the present case. First, in both instances
the damage complained of occurred during construction and after the date of summons. Id.
Second, in both the Campbell case and the present case, the construction of the project had been
completed as of the time of trial such that the full impact of the damage purportedly caused by
the construction activities could be seen at trial. Id. at 604-05, 202 P. at 1066. In fact, the jury in
both cases visited the property and saw first-hand the impacts of the projects. Id. at 604-05, 202
P. at 1066; see CR 2215. Despite these similarities and the express ruling by the Supreme Court,
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district court reached the opposite conclusion. The district court's ruling in this case cannot
be reconciled with the decision in Campbell and is therefore properly reversed. See State v.
Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 22 896 P.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the doctrine of stare
decisis applies to the interpretation and construction of statutes).

a.

Under the Idaho-Western case,§ 7-711(2)(a) Does Not Permit
Severance Damages for Injury Caused During Construction.

In addition to being at odds with the court's decision in Campbell, the district court's
conclusion that Brooke View could recover damages that occurred during project construction is
also contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 568, 119 P. at
60. In that case, a railway company brought a condemnation action to acquire a 100-foot wide
strip ofland on the southwest side of the landowner's premises to construct a rail line. Id. at 573,
119 P. at 61. The property at issue involved what was then known as the Coeur d'Alene
College. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed the language of Section 5220 of the Revised
Codes, which is identical to the current§ 7-711(2)(a), and specifically discussed the provision at
issue in the present case-"the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Id. at 580-82, 119 P.
at 64. In its analysis, the court noted, "that statute specifically authorizes taking into
consideration 'the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff."' Id.
at 581, 119 P. at 64. The court explained that this provision "clearly authorizes the landowner to
introduce evidence showing the damage and injury that the particular improvement or structure
for which the condemnation is sought will cause to the remainder of his property." Id.

(emphasis added). In order to permit the landowner to present such evidence, the court further
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explained that the condemnor was required to disclose the purpose for which the property is
sought "and the general nature and character of the improvement or structure he expects to
erect." Id. at 581-82, 119 P. at 64. The entire focus of the court's interpretation of what is now§
7-711(2)(a) centered on the specific "improvement or structure" that was being proposed, the
particular character of that "improvement or structure," and the "damage and injury that the
particular improvement or structure will cause to the remainder of [the landowner's] property."
Id. By contrast, nothing in the court's analysis suggests that the statutory language of§ 7-

711(2)(a) implicates damages caused by the physical act of constructing the railway.
Additionally, the court's interpretation of Section 5220 as applied to the facts of that case
further supports the conclusion that the statute's reference to "the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff' means the structure or improvement to be
built on the property being taken. In its analysis, the court acknowledged that severance
damages might exist because "[a] result of the construction and operation of that [railroad] line
will be noise from passing trains and locomotives." Id. at 585, 119 P. 66. In other words, the
court's consideration of severance damages was based upon the impact the existence and
operation of the structure proposed by the condemnor had on the remainder property-not for the
acts the condemnor or its agents did or did not undertake during construction of the rail line.
Thus, the district court's interpretation of§ 7-711 (2)(a) directly conflicts with that of IdahoWestern and must be reversed. See Climer, 127 Idaho at 22, 896 P.2d at 348.
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b.

Consistent with Campbell and Idaho-Western, Numerous Other Idaho
Cases Have Applied§ 7-711(2)(a) to Mean the Structures or
Improvements to Be Built and Not to Physical Construction Activities
and Alleged Damage Caused During Those Activities.

Numerous other cases are consistent with Campbell and Idaho-Western, demonstrating
that severance damage awards arise from the existence of the particular structure to be built as
part of the project-not from the physical acts of construction. These include:

•

Bastian, 97 Idaho at 447, 546 P.2d at 402 (condemnation action in which term
"construction" was used to mean the structure built-"The taking of defendants' property
through the process of eminent domain and the consequent damage to the remaining
property had no necessary relationship to the median construction. The placement of the
medians and any consequent injury such might cause are the results of an exercise of the
State's police power rather than a taking under its power of eminent domain." (emphasis
added));

•

State ex. rel. Burns v. Blair, 91 Idaho 137, 138-140, 417 P.2d 217, 218-220 (1966)
(condemnation action in which the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed severance damages
based upon the structure that would be located on the property, and not based upon the
physical act of construction);

•

State ex. rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 279-280, 328 P.2d 60, 65-66 (1958)
(eminent domain proceeding in which Idaho Supreme Court applied the severance
damage language of§ 7-711 in reference to the structure built as part of the project and
not to the physical act of construction, stating that the severance damages would "consist
of [ 1] the reasonable market value of the land taken, together with all improvements
thereon located and taken in this proceeding, [and 2] severance damage to the remainder,
through which the road runs due to its severance from the whole, which severance
damage would include, among other damage sustained, the curtailment and restriction of
access to highway No. 95, as formerly enjoyed, and access to the railroad as enjoyed
prior to the construction of the new road." (emphasis added));

•

Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,290 & 296, 328 P.2d 397, 398 & 402 (1958), overruled on
other grounds by Covington v. Jefferson Cty., 137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002) (inverse
condemnation action in which Idaho Supreme Court discussed "construction" of project
by way of reference to the structures being built-there the "construction of a new
bridge"-and not the physical act of constructing the project itself);

•

State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 1112, 1116-17 (1955)
(condemnation action in which term "construction" within context of§ 7-711 was used to
refer to the structure built as part of the project, and not the actual construction work to
build the project - "Convenience of access to a highway, formerly enjoyed by appellant,
and impaired by reason of the new construction, could be considered by the jury with the
other testimony in fixing the amount of damages sustained[,]" and "The jury should have
been instructed that nothing could be deducted from damages sustained to the remainder
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because of claimed special or direct benefits by the construction of the improvement in
the manner proposed." (emphasis added));

•

Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 302-18, 53 P.2d 626, 630-37 (1935) (holding that the
construction of a subway in the middle of the street did not constitute a compensable
taking and referencing the term "construction" to refer to the structure that would be built
or the manner in which such structure would be used).

These cases demonstrate ho\v the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the term
"construction" as it relates to severance damage awards to mean the structure or improvement
being built as part of the project, and not the physical acts that occur during construction.
To be sure, if the term "construction" is interpreted to mean acts occurring during
construction, as applied by the district court, it would preclude landowners from recovering
severance damages that are typically awarded for the existence of the structure of the
improvement, as proposed, on the property taken. This is because the term "construction" as
used in Code§ 7-711(2)(a) cannot at the same time mean both the acts of construction and the
thing that is proposed to be constructed, as these are two different meanings of the same word.

See Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep 't of Homeland Sec., 600 F .3d 107 6, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010)
(overruled in part on other grounds by Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F .3d 504, 516 (9th Cir.
2012) (it is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute can have only one
meaning."); see also DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/construction (last
visited June 6, 2016) ("construction" can mean either "the act or art of constructing" or
"something that is constructed; a structure").

If the district court's interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) is affirmed, then the phrase "the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff' can only mean that
severance damages are those damages arising from the physical acts of construction. A
landowner would then be precluded from also recovering severance damages resulting from the
structure that is proposed to be built on the property taken or the contemplated use or operation
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of that structure. Were this Court to uphold the district court's interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a), it
would overrule myriad decisions of this Court that have upheld severance damage awards for the
existence of the proposed structure or improvement. See, e.g., Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 58485, 119 P. at 65 (concluding that the prior version of§ 7-711(2)(a) authorizes the landowner to
introduce evidence showing the damage and injury the proposed structure or improvement will
cause to the remainder property); see also Burns, Fonburg, Hughes, Powell, Bastian, Dunclick
cases, supra. Such a result cannot stand, and the district court's interpretation must be rejected.

3.

Idaho Code§ 7-711 Does Not Permit A Landowner to Recover for Every
Type of Damage Caused to His or Her Property As Part of Just
Compensation.

The rulings discussed above are consistent with the entire body of Idaho eminent domain
decisions which consistently hold that under Idaho's Constitution and eminent domain statutes, a
landowner is not entitled to receive compensation for every type of damage to his or her
property. See, e.g., State, Idaho Transp. Bd. v. HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334,338,282 P.3d
595,599 (2012) (upholding district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that "not all
government impairments of an access right are compensable"); Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass 'n,
140 Idaho 536, 541, 96 P .3d 63 7, 642 (2004) (holding that "before an owner is entitled to
compensation for a violation of Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution, his property must be
'taken' and not merely 'damaged"').
In its decisions, the Court has defined what is and is not legally compensable in
condemnation cases in Idaho and has specifically concluded that certain forms of damages are
barred as a matter oflaw.
•

Damages that are barred by law or that are not caused by the taking of a
compensable property right are not recoverable in a condemnation action.
Fonburg, 80 Idaho at 277-78, 328 P.2d at 64.

•

No compensable taking occurs and no damages result where a right of
access "is not destroyed or substantially impaired and the remaining
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access is reasonable." HI Boise, 153 Idaho at 338, 282 P.3d at 599; see
also Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 145, 742 P.2d 397,400 (1987).
•

Damages caused by the restriction of access or the diversion of traffic held
not recoverable. Bastian, 97 Idaho at 447, 546 P.2d at 402; Brown v. City
of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 43, 855 P.2d 876, 880 (1993).

•

Damages resulting from lost business profits held not recoverable.
Bastian, 97 Idaho at 448,546 P.2d at 403; State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson,
86 Idaho 242,247, 384 P.2d 480,483 (1963).

•

Damages caused from claims of loss of visibility held not recoverable. HI Boise,
153 Idaho at 341-43, 282 P.3d at 604.

•

Damages caused by the temporary obstruction of access, unless the action is
unreasonable, unnecessary, arbitrary or capricious held not recoverable. Hadfield
v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561,567,388 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1963).

•

Future claims for damages based on possible negligent operation of public project
are improper and not recoverable. Pac. Nw. Pipeline Corp. v. Waller, 80 Idaho
105, 109,326 P.2d 388, 390-91 (1958).

•

Damages that are contingent, speculative or remote are not recoverable. Palmer
v. Highway Dist. No. 1, Bonner Cty., 49 Idaho 596,602,290 P. 393,394 (1930).

•

Noise damages "should not be considered as an element of damage in the
ordinary case." Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 585-86, 119 P. at 66.

•

Damages that are shared in common with the rest of the general public are not
recoverable. Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 90, 120 P. 830,
834 (1911).

•

Damages must be limited to those losses that arise directly from the taking itself
and not from other aspects of the project. HI Boise, 153 Idaho at 339-42, 282
P.3d at 600-03; Mabe v. State, 86 Idaho 254, 259-60, 385 P.2d 401,404 (1963).

•

Damages caused to remainder property during construction of the project and that
had accrued after the date of summons is not compensable in a condemnation
action and must be brought in a separate action. Campbell, 34 Idaho at 604-05,
202 P. 1066.

The damages sought, and ultimately recovered, by Brooke View in this case for physical
injury caused to the Entry Walls during construction are not compensable damages in a
condemnation case, and the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Brooke
View could pursue and recover such damages.
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4.

Cases In Other Jurisdictions Are In Accord with Campbell and IdahoWestern and Require That Damage Caused During Construction Are Not
Compensable In A Condemnation Action.

Other state supreme courts in jurisdictions with statutes that mirror the language of Idaho
Code §§ 7-711 and 7-712 have addressed whether severance damages for damages occurring
during construction are compensabie in a condemnation action and have heid that they are not.
Such damages sound in tort, not condemnation.
The case City ofAnchorage v. Scavenius, 539 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1975) is particularly
instructive. There, the City of Anchorage filed an action to condemn permanent seven-foot-wide
utility easements and temporary thirty-foot-wide construction easements for the placement of a
water transmission main across defendants' property. Id. at 11 71. The defendants contested the
amount of just compensation offered by the city and contended that pavement on the remainder
portion of their property was damaged by the manner in which the water main was installed. Id.
Prior to trial, the defendants indicated that they were going to present a substantial claim
for pavement damage, which they alleged occurred at the time that the water main was installed.
Id. at 11 77. The city sought an order preventing consideration of the pavement damage claim at

trial on the ground that such a claim alleged tort, rather than condemnation, damages. Id.
Alternatively, the city argued that the owners should be required to file a counterclaim, in tort,
for such pavement damage. Id.
The trial court denied the city's request, and the case proceeded to trial. The defendants
thereafter put on evidence at trial that a parking lot on their property, not subject to the take, was
damaged as a result of the manner in which the water main was installed. Id. Given the court's
prior ruling permitting the defendants to litigate the pavement damage claim, the city had to meet
defendants' causation evidence with evidence of its own. Id. The city therefore argued that the
parking lot's poor foundation was the cause of the damage, not the construction of the water
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The jury sided with the city. Id. After the verdict, the trial court denied the city's
motion for fees and costs based upon its earlier conclusion that the claim sounded in
condemnation, not tort. The city appealed the denial of its request for fees and costs. Id. The
Alaska Supreme Court therefore had the occasion to address the same issue that is before this
Court-under the very same statutory framework.
The Alaska Supreme Court held, "[ w ]hen the damage claim is based upon the allegedly
negligent construction of the improvement, however, any loss incurred cannot properly be
considered a part of the taking." Id. The court reasoned, "[t]his is so because the date set forth
by statute when the valuation of the owner's loss is to be measured is generally fixed at a time
prior to the actual construction of the improvement." Id. at 1177-78. In support of this
conclusion, it quoted Alaska Statutes§ 09.55.330, which mirrors the language ofldaho Code
§ 7-712. Compare Alaska Stat.§ 09.55.330 with Idaho Code§ 7-712. The Alaska Supreme
Court went on to state the obvious, "[i]t is presumed that the condemnor will build the called for
improvement without negligence and the just compensation award is to be determined based on
that assumption." Id. at 1178. The court then clarified, however, "[i]f, in fact, the condemnor's
actions outside the inherent scope of the taking result in additional injury to the owner, he may
be able to bring an action in tort against the condemnor." Id. The same analysis and conclusion
applies to the Idaho statutory framework.
The Alaska Supreme Court then focused directly on the language that is at the center of
this appeal. Alaska's takings statute,just like Idaho's, allows a condemnee to recover from a
condemnor '"damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the
improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Compare Alaska Stat. § 09.55.3 lO(a)
with Idaho Code§ 7-711(2). The court noted that this portion of Alaska's statute "exclude[s]
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consideration of tortious injuries from condemnation damages." Id. at 1178. It also said,
"[ o]bviously, the condemnor proposes or intends non-negligent construction in every case." Id.
After its analysis of the Alaska statute, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the trial court's decision as to costs and fees because it held that "[t]he issue raised by the
defendants concerning damages to the parking lot pavement was one involving a charge of
negligent construction or negligent failure to properly repave the areas affected by the
construction activity." Id. Particularly relevant here, the court concluded, "[p]ursuant to the
City's request, the trial court should have required the owners here to file a counterclaim in tort."
Id.

The Alaska Supreme Court relied, in part, on a Montana Supreme Court decision which
came to the same conclusion after reviewing the Montana statutory framework governing
condemnation-which, like Alaska, also mirrors Idaho Code §§ 7-711 and 712. Id. at 11 78-79
(quoting Freeser, 74 P. 407):
When damages are appraised prior to the construction of the
improvements for which the land is condemned, the estimate
should be made on the assumption that the improvements will be
properly constructed; and, if they are constructed pending the
condemnation proceedings, the rule under this statute should be
the same. The actual effect of the properly constructed
improvements in the manner proposed by plaintiff as to the larger
parcel should control the appraisal. If the improvements are
improperly or negligently constructed, no additional damage
should be given for this reason.
Freeser, 74 P. at 408.

A similar conclusion was reached in Division ofAdministration, Department of
Transportation v. HillsboroAss'n, Inc., 286 So. 2d 578,579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). In that

case, the Florida Court of Appeals held that severance damages in a condemnation action does
not include damages "as a result of the manner in which the construction is performed." Id.
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'

The court stated that "[t]he injury or damage caused is damnum absque injuria where the
construction is lawful and performed without negligence or misconduct." Id. However, "[i]f the
damages result from negligence or misconduct in performing the construction, they would be the
proper subject of a separate action in tort (where sovereign immunity is waived) or the proper
subject of the claims bill (as was done in this case." Id. Thus the court concluded that such
damages that occur during construction "are not properly to be considered in an eminent domain
proceeding." Id.
Learned Treatises addressing the same issue have come to the same conclusion. See 4A14 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 14.03 (2015) ("Some damages, although they arise as a
consequence of the taking, are not compensable as part of the just compensation award in the
condemnation proceeding, but may be recoverable in a separate action on theories of tort,
contract, trespass, nuisance, and the like. For example, acts of trespass by the contractor,
although a 'but for' consequence of the public project necessitating the taking, are generally not
compensable as part of the eminent domain proceeding."); see also 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain
§ 167 (2016) ("In proceedings to condemn land or to recover compensation for land already
taken or injured, no damages are included except such as necessarily arise from a lawful taking
and a proper construction and operation of the improvement. Damages caused by willful,
negligent, or improper acts in the construction of an improvement ... are not recoverable in the
condemnation proceedings, the remedy, if any, of the landowner in such cases being an
independent action for damages or a legislative claims bill.") (citing Waller, 80 Idaho 105, 326
P.2d 388).
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5.

The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) Invalidates 30 Years
of Eminent Domain Case Law Governing Attorney Fee Awards in
Condemnation Actions.

The district court's interpretation would not only undermine Idaho's entire body of case
law governing severance damage awards, it would also undermine 30 years of this Court's
rulings on attorney fee awards in condemnation actions and make it virtually impossible for any
governmental agency to satisfy the standards set forth inAcarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d
1067, and its progeny cases.
It has long been held that the standard for awarding attorney fees in condemnation actions
differs from the typical standard applied in other cases. Grathol, 158 Idaho at 51, 343 P.3d at
493 (citingAcarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876-78, 673 P.2d at 1070-72). In the typical case, attorney
fees may be awarded if the action was brought and pursued "frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation." Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876-77, 673 P.2d at 1070-71. However, because a
governmental entity will rarely be found to have initiated a condemnation action "frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation," this Court created a separate rule for awarding attorney
fees in such cases. Id.
Under the rule announced in Acarrequi, cost and attorney fee awards in condemnation
actions focus on whether the condemner made a reasonable pre-trial offer of settlement. Id. at
877,673 P.2d at 1071. A pre-trial offer of settlement is considered reasonable ifit is at least
90% of the ultimate jury verdict and made within "a reasonable period after the institution of the
action" and not "on the courthouse steps an hour before trial." Id. at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072. 15

15

The Acarrequi case also established additional factors for the district court to consider. Those
factors consisted of ( 1) whether the condemnee contested the allegations of public use and
necessity, (2) the outcome of any hearing on such a challenge, (3) whether the condemner made
any modifications in the plans or designs of the project that resulted from the landowner's
challenge, and (4) whether the condemnee voluntarily granted possession of the property
pending the resolution of the just compensation issue. Id. at 878, 673 P .2d at 1072.
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The rules announced in Acarrequi were further developed in State ex rel. Ohman v. Ivan H

Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991) ("Talbot"), State ex rel. Smith v.
Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137 (1997), and Grathol, 158 Idaho 38, 343 P.3d 493.
In creating this standard for cost and attorney fee awards in condemnation actions, the
Idaho Supreme Court recognized that while
the ultimate jury award is a far from perfect point of departure in
attempting to gauge the reasonableness of the positions of the
parties, ... given the entire theory of eminent domain, i.e., that a
jury will determine the just compensation to be awarded the
condemnee, we must, it seems, assume that a jury verdict at least
approximates the fair market value of the property taken and the
damages which will result to the remainder.

Acarrequi, l 05 Idaho at 878, 673 P .2d at 1072. Thus, the goal behind the Acarrequi factors is to
determine the reasonableness of the condemner's settlement offer based upon how that offer
compares to the jury's ultimate determination of just compensation-which, in tum, is based
upon the fair market value of the property taken. If the government's fair-market-value based
offer is timely and within 10% of the jury's fair-market-value based verdict, then the government
may be found to be the prevailing party and be relieved of having to pay the landowner's costs
and attorney fees. 16
In the present case, ACHD offered the condemnee Brooke View the sum of $7,738.47
and then $8,512.32 before the Complaint was filed. See CR 6591. The jury found the amount of
"just compensation" for the taking to be $5,291.50-not including the jury's severance

16

The condemner may also, in the "extreme and unlikely" case, recover attorney fees from the
landowner if the condemner satisfies the standards set forth in Grathol, 158 Idaho at 51-52, 343
P.3d at 493-94.
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damages/cost-to-cure award for damage allegedly caused during construction. 17 The standard set
in Acarrequi and confirmed in Grathol was thus met by ACHD. 18
However, the jury also awarded $141,000 as a "cost to cure" the damages allegedly
caused to the Entry Walls during construction of the Project. The additional sums awarded by
the jury are not properly part of the amount of just compensation owed under§ 7-711(2)(a).
Rather, those additional sums represented the jury's evaluation of the physical damage that was
allegedly caused to the Entry Walls during the acts of construction. Accordingly, Brooke View's
claims for damages allegedly caused during construction-and after the date of summons-had
no relevance to the amount to be awarded to Brooke View as part of the taking of its property,
but rather should have been evaluated and litigated in a separate action. See Campbell, 34 Idaho
at 604-05, 202 P. at 1066.
The significance of the district court's error with respect to the Acarrequi standards is
that the district court's improper interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) created a scenario where it would
frequently be impossible for the condemnor to satisfy the Acarrequi factors. Under the district
court's interpretation, the landowner is permitted to hyper-inflate the jury's verdict with damages
occurring during construction, whereas the condemnor' s Acarrequi offer is based upon a pure
fair market value and damages analysis. When the condemnor makes its Acarrequi offer, the
condemnor may not be aware of-and cannot legitimately assess-damage that might occur

17

The district court awarded an additur $2,098.53 to the jury's verdict in order to increase the
jury's award to the amount of the Brooke View Property's assessed value for a total value of the
property take of $7,390.21. CR 5758. If this figure is used as the amount of the jury verdict for
purposes of the Acarrequi analysis, ACHD still satisfies the requirements.
18

At trial, ACHD conceded that the amount of just compensation owed to Brooke View was
$8,512.32. CR 4901. If this figure is used as the amount of the jury's verdict for purposes of the
Acarrequi analysis, ACHD still satisfies the requirements.
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during construction, because construction will likely not yet have occurred. A condemnor
cannot fairly be expected to include in its Acarrequi offer damages that it cannot contemplate or
calculate. Additionally, a jury's verdict that improperly includes damages caused during the
construction of the project cannot be a fair approximation of the fair market value of the property
taken and the resulting damages, as contemplated by Acarrequi. If a jury is allowed to consider
what occurs during the construction, the verdict will be based upon unknown elements and
information the condemnor was not privy to when it made its good faith pre-trial settlement
offer, and it will be supported by elements other than what constitutes "just compensation" and
what is contemplated by Acarrequi. It might occur that a condemnor is ultimately able to satisfy
the Acarrequi standards under the district court's interpretation, but if it did-as ACHD did in
this case-it would only be because it offered a greater amount than what is properly recoverable
in a condemnation action.
The effect of such an interpretation is not only to raise the bar to make it nearly
impossible for a condemnor to satisfy the Acarrequi standards, but it will also render
meaningless the Acarrequi analysis and undo more than 30-years of eminent domain case law.
The district court's interpretation is incorrect and should not be permitted to stand.

6.

The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) Effectively Eliminates the
Design Immunity Afforded to Public Entities.

Statutes should be construed in pari materia. City ofSandpoint v. Sandpoint lndep.

Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003). Statutes are in pari materia if they
relate to the same subject. Id. Conflicting statutes pertaining to the same subject are, so far as
reasonably possible, to be construed in harmony with each other. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho
378, 380, 987 P.2d 290,292 (1999).
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Idaho Code §§ 7-711(2)(a) and 6-904(7) both address plans for the construction of
improvements-§ 7-711(2)(a) with regard to a governmental entity's proposed improvements,
and§ 6-904(7) with regard to a governmental entity's plan or design for "highways, roads,
streets, bridges, or other public property." Compare Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(a) with§ 6-904(7). 19
Section 7-711 (2)( a) allows recovery of severance damage for "the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff', while § 6-904(7) provides a governmental
entity immunity for a claim "aris[ing] out of a plan or design for construction or improvement."
Indeed, for a condemnee like Brooke View to recover severance damages under§ 7-711(2)(a), it
must concede that the condemnor has a plan or design for the construction of the improvement.
This is because the condemnee must prove damage based upon "the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Idaho Code§ 7-7I 1(2)(a) (emphasis
added).
The only way to read Idaho Code§§ 7-711(2)(a) and 6-904(7) in harmony is to interpret
§ 7-711(2)(a) to apply to the existence of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff (consistent with the requirements of§ 7-712)-not to the acts involved in the physical
construction of the improvement. This is because § 6-904(7) provides a governmental entity
immunity for the construction of an improvement that arise out of a design prepared in
19

Idaho Code § 6-904(7) provides:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope
of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for
any claim which: ...
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the
highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan or
design is prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design
standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in
advance of the construction by the legislative body of the governmental entity or
by some other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to
give such approval.
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substantial conformance with engineering and design standards. Read otherwise, and in the
manner adopted by the district court, § 7-711 (2)(a) would grant the very damages for which § 6904(7) provides immunity. Instead,§ 7-711(2)(a) must be read to address what§ 6-904(7) does
not-severance damage created by the impact, if any, the proposed improvement or structure
may have on the remainder parcel. This is particularly so, because§ 7-711(2)(a) addresses the
existence of the structure "in the manner proposed"-not in the manner constructed. 20
In this case, the district court eliminated ACHD's right to assert design immunity against
Brooke View's claim of property damage allegedly caused during construction of the
improvement proposed by ACHD. After the district court denied ACHD's Third Motion for
Summary Judgment and held that no evidence of negligence would be admissible at trial, see CR
763,21 ACHD moved for summary judgment under the Idaho Tort Claim Act. See CR 1302-07;
1386-88. This motion was justified, even compelled, because if ACHD constructed the Project
as proposed, pursuant to a plan or design prepared in substantial conformance with engineering
and design standards, the design immunity of§ 6-904(7) would apply. Notwithstanding the
compelling nature of this argument, the district court rejected the application of the Idaho Tort
Claim Act stating:

20

If "construction" in§ 7-711(2)(a) was interpreted to mean physical damage caused by the act
of construction and not simply the damage caused by the existence of the improvement or
structure proposed to be built,§ 7-711(2)(a) and§ 6-904(7) would be an irreconcilable. In that
case, the more specific and later in date statute controls. See Beehler v. Fremont Cty., 145 Idaho
656,658, 182 P.3d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 2008). Section 6-904(7) is later in date and specific to
plans and designs for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets. Section 6904(7) should therefore control.
21

Although the court initially held that evidence of negligence would not be allowed, it changed
its position and held that ACHD was liable for "all of the ramifications of the construction." TT
320; see also CR 4918 (Jury Instruction No. 27: "For purposes of your decision you are to
assume ACHD is responsible for all construction work performed as part of the Curtis Road
Project.").
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... [I]f this were a tort case, that would be completely different.
It's not. And for that reason I'm not going to really address the
exemptions and things in the Tort Claims Act. The Tort Claims
Act doesn't apply here. I've already overruled (sic) that and if
they overrule me, they overrule me.
TT 322-23; see also CR 3281-84.
The trial record establishes that ACHD constructed the Project pursuant to a plan or
design prepared in substantial conformance with engineering and design standards. See TT
3199. Thus, the district court erred not only in its interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) but also in its
failure to apply the immunity ofldaho Code§ 6-904(7) to Brooke View's claim to damages
allegedly caused during construction.

7.

The District Court's Erroneous Decision to Allow Evidence of Damage
Caused During the Acts of Construction was Further Compounded Because
it Prohibited ACHD From Offering Tort Defenses.

As discussed in Section IV.C.2, 4, supra, Brooke View should have been required to
pursue its allegations of damage caused during construction of the Project in a separate tort
action. See Campbell, 34 Idaho at 604-05, 202 P. at 1066; City ofAnchorage, 539 P.2d at 117879; Freeser, 74 P. at 408; Hillsboro Ass 'n., 286 So. 2d at 579. And had Brooke View
appropriately done so, ACHD would have been afforded the opportunity to put on evidence of
tort defenses. However, because of the district court's legal rulings and its instructions to the
jury, including Instruction Nos. 20, 24, and 27, while Brooke View was allowed to try tort
theories, ACHD was precluded from trying tort defenses. See, e.g., CR 4911, 4915, 4918.
In a tort action, a defendant is entitled to litigate numerous defenses. See, e.g., Davis v.
First Interstate Bank ofIdaho, NA., 115 Idaho 169, 170, 765 P.2d 680, 681 (1988) (holding that

mitigation, "also known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences, provides that a plaintiff who
is injured ... is ordinarily denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by
reasonable acts"); Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,875,204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009) (requiring the
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plaintiff to demonstrate proximate cause); Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc. 101
Idaho 783,787,621 P.2d 399,403 (1980) (holding "a jury must have the opportunity to consider
the negligence of all parties to the transaction, whether or not they be parties to the lawsuit and
whether or not they can be liable to the plaintiff'); Harris v. State, Dep 't. ofHealth & Welfare,
123 Idaho 295, 300, 847 P.2d 1156, 1161 (1992) (applying immunity under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act).
In this case-a tort case tried in a condemnation case-the district court afforded ACHD
absolutely no tort defenses. The result, therefore, was to hold ACHD strictly liable for the acts
of every person or entity in any way related to the Project, which included contractors, thirdparty utilities, and even Brooke View's owner, Diane Miller.
Through Instruction No. 20, the district court relieved Brooke View from having to prove
proximate cause. CR 4911 ("Brooke View does not have to prove the mechanism for how such
damage, if any, occurred."). Through Instruction No. 24, the district court precluded ACHD
from arguing that Brooke View, and its owner Diane Miller, failed to mitigate damages or
contributed to the damage. CR 4915 ("There has been evidence Brooke View did not notify
ACHD at the time it claims it discovered cracks on its walls on or about November 1, 2012.
This issue has been the subject of prior rulings by this Court and the Court ruled that this fact has
no relevancy to any issue to be decided by you. Therefore, you are instructed that you are not to
consider this fact in arriving at your decision or to discuss it in deliberations."). 22 And through
Instruction No. 27 the district court told the jury that ACHD was responsible for every person,
activity, or event related to the Project. CR 4918. ("For purposes of your decision you are to
22

The district court ruled that Diane Miller's testimony that she identified the first crack in the
wall on November 1, 2012 but told no one about it was irrelevant. See, e.g., TT 3141. The court
would not allow ACHD to present evidence regarding what would have happened if Ms. Miller
had reported the crack so ACHD made an offer of proof regarding the issue. TT 3274-75.
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assume ACHD is responsible for all construction work performed as part of the Curtis Road
Project."). 23
Under the district court's approach, if the jury concluded that the Entry Walls were
damaged, the jury was required to infer that ACHD caused the damage. 24 Further, regardless if
others contributed to the damage-whether intentionally or negligently-the district court also
required the jury to hold ACHD 100% responsible. And at the end of the day, the damage award
rendered by the jury was in the form of 'just compensation" for a taking pursuant to article I,
section 14 ofldaho's Constitution and Idaho Code§ 7-71 l(a)(2), so the usual recovery
mechanisms for a tort judgment, indemnification or contribution from other responsible parties,
were unavailable to ACHD.
The district court committed legal error by allowing Brooke View to try tort theories in
this condemnation case, and the district court compounded this error by precluding ACHD from
trying any tort defenses.

8.

The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) Will Lead to Inconsistent
Results.

Construction of a statute "that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are
disfavored." See Friends ofFarm to Mkt. v. Valley Cty., 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14

23

In this case, Owyhee Construction performed work for United Water. ACHD had no authority
or ability to control Owyhee Construction, yet the district court ruled as a matter oflaw that
ACHD was responsible for Owyhee Construction and its work. See, e.g., TT 3320-21, 3332-33.
If the district court is affirmed, in other future condemnation cases, the condemnor will likewise
be held strictly liable for the consequences of all municipalities, power companies, irrigation
districts, cable providers, or any other utility or entity that work in the area of the project.
24

This legal determination and instruction to the jury is equivalent to the application of the
doctrine res ipsa loquitur. See Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562,566,272 P.3d 534,
538 (2012) (describing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a method of establishing liability by
means of inferences, rather than direct proof) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, the
district court even acknowledged the similarities to the doctrine of res ipsa. ("THE COURT: It's
like a res ipsa."). See TT 57:3.
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(2002). Allowing a condemnee to recover damage caused during the act of construction would
indeed lead to absurd results. The inconsistent results stemming from such an interpretation is
demonstrated below:

a.

Scenario 1: Two Adjoining Property Owners and the Condemnation
of the Property of Only One Owner.

In the first scenario, two adjoining property owners, owner A and owner B, have fee title
to land adjacent to a roadway right-of-way. The owner of the right-of-way seeks to improve the
right-of-way, and to do so it must condemn a small portion of the land owned by owner A, but
none of the land owned by owner B.
Both owner A and owner B claim that during construction the project caused physical
property damage to their remainder property. Under the district court's reading of Idaho Code
§§ 7-711 and 7-712, owner A, as a condemnee, will be able to seek damages from the owner of
the right-of-way without addressing Idaho's Tort Claim Act including Idaho Code§ 6-904(7),
without establishing proximate cause, and without regard to well-established tort defenses, such
as mitigation and apportionment ofliability. Yet, owner B, who alleges the very same damages,
will have to address and comply with Idaho's Tort Claim Act including Idaho Code§ 6-904(7),
will have to establish proximate cause, and will have to overcome standard tort defenses.

b.

Scenario 2: Two Adjoining Property Owners and the Condemnation
of Property of Both Owners.

In the second scenario, the same facts exist as in scenario 1 with two adjoining property
owners, owner A and owner B, each owning fee title to land alongside a roadway right-of-way.
The owner of the right-of-way seeks to improve the right-of-way, and to do so it must condemn a
small portion of the land owned by both owner A and owner B.
Prior to construction, owner A and condemnor agree to just compensation for the taking
of owner A's property. This amount necessarily includes damage "by reason of ... the
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construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff' as provided in Idaho
Code§ 7-711. Owner Band the right-of-way owner cannot agree as to just compensation, but
the right-of-way owner is able to take possession of the portion of owner B's property under
Idaho's "quick take" statute, Idaho Code § 7-721, pending a trial. Later, both owner A and
owner B claim that their property was damaged during the construction of the project.
Under the district court's reading of Idaho Code § 7-711, owner B could seek the
"during-construction" damages in his condemnation action and would not have to comply with
the Idaho Tort Claim Act nor address duty and proximate cause. Whereas, owner A would be
precluded from any further recovery. See, e.g., Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53 P.2d 626
(1935) (holding that a condemnee is allowed to receive just compensation one time from
property taken). Based upon the district court's ruling, disparate and inconsistent results would
arise. Additionally, no condemnation action could be resolved prior to the completion of
construction because of the risk of additional damages that might be caused during construction.
This cannot be what was contemplated by Idaho's statutes.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 7-711(2)(A)
RESULTED IN IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE BEING PRESENTED TO THE JURY
AND FORMED THE BASIS OF THE JURY'S VERDICT.

Idaho law is clear that compensation must be assessed for each source of damage
separately (Idaho Code§ 7-711(5)), and non-compensable elements must be eliminated from the
amount of just compensation sought. Bastian, 97 Idaho at 449,546 P.2d at 404. In particular,
this Court has held that opinions of witnesses in condemnation actions that are based upon
elements of damage not recognized by law are not to be presented to the jury. Mabe, 86 Idaho at
261-62, 385 P.2d at 406. "Only such opinions as are based upon evidence oflawful elements of
damage can be of benefit to a jury in the assessment of the amount of damage." Id. (quoting
Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Talbot, 152 N.E. 486,488 (1926)). An expert whose opinions
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include elements of damage that are not compensable must either "eliminate that portion of the
damages which is noncompensable," and ifhe or she cannot, then "their testimony must be
stricken and the jury advised to disregard it in its entirety." Bastian, 97 Idaho at 449, 546 P.2d at
404.
The district court's legal conclusion as to the interpretation of§ 7-7I 1(2)(a) resulted in
improper and irrelevant evidence being presented to the jury, which formed the basis for the
jury's damage award to Brooke View. See discussion at Section II.B.9-10, supra describing
witnesses testimony and evidence presented at trial. Specifically, more than one-third of the 35
witnesses called at trial testified at length about the construction of ACHD's Project and how
that construction damaged the Entry Walls. See, e.g., TT 1946, 1560, 1703, 2092-93, 2235-36,
941-45, 1682-8~ 1695-9~ 1904-08,3057-63,3253-5~3280-318,3351-67,3495-50~ 1014-4~
1052-62. A detailed listing of the witnesses and their testimony is attached to this Brief as
Addendum A. Additionally, at least 181 of the 301 exhibits admitted at trial were solely directed
at establishing the fact of and scope of damage that occurred during the acts of construction.
This evidence included 66 exhibits containing more than 400 photographs of hundreds of cracks
in the wall allegedly caused during construction. A complete listing of the exhibits admitted at
trial that fall in this category is attached to this Brief as Addendum B.
The district court's rulings resulted in expert opinions and evidence of non-compensable
elements of damage to be submitted to the jury and that improperly influenced the jury's verdict.
The effect of the district court's error caused substantial prejudice to ACHD and the portion of
the Judgment that was based upon this error should be vacated.
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THE DISTRICT COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE CONTRARY TO IDAHO'S EMINENT
DOMAIN LAWS.

The district court erred in providing jury instructions at trial that misstated the law.
When combined with the extensive evidence regarding construction activities and alleged
damage that occurred during the Project construction-which was the direct result of the district
court's erroneous rulings-the instructions misled the jury and required them to award damages
based on the events that occurred during construction. As a result, the jury awarded Brooke
View non-compensable severance damages that occurred during construction of the Project.
The district court gave a "before and after" instruction to the jury (Instruction No. 22)
that is virtually identical to IDJI 7.16.5, and it gave instructions that identified the date of the
summons Value as July 11, 2012 (Instructions No. 9, 15, 16), which is the date as of which
Brooke View's damages were to be assessed. CR 4900, 4906, 4907, 4913. While these
instructions are seemingly in accordance with Idaho law and the model jury instructions, the
district court nullified these instructions by giving other instructions (Instruction Nos. 15, 20, 27)
that advised the jury to depart from the "before and after" rule and consider evidence that
occurred after the date of the summons by instructing the jury to consider damages incurred
during "construction of the improvement project." CR 4906, 4911, 4918.
Instruction No. 15 misstated the law of damages in an eminent domain case:
Just compensation means the fair market value of the property
taken, including all permanent improvements thereon together with
any direct damages suffered by Brooke View as a result of the
taking or construction of the improvement project in the manner
proposed by ACHD, all measured as of July 11, 2012.
CR 4906 (emphasis added). ACHD objected to this instruction, and more specifically to the
language added by the district court that did not conform with the pattern jury instructions. TT
3925-26. By inserting additional language into the pattern instruction, the district court created
two separate categories of direct damages for the jury to consider: ( 1) direct damages as a result
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taking; and (2) direct damages incurred during construction. Because the focus of the trial
was on whether the Entry Walls were damaged during construction, the jury had no choice but to
award these improper damages.
Moreover, the district court made it known from the beginning of this case that, in her
view, severance damages that include damage occurring during construction are compensable
under Idaho law:
The legislature -- and I can't emphasize this enough -- our
Constitution guarantees to property owners that if their property is
going to be taken by the government in pursuant -- pursuant to
their governmental powers, they are going to compensate that
property owner because that property belongs first to the property
owner and does not belong to the government. The government
must pay for that property. And the way we determine how much
is paid is we have established case law on how that is. And it's
based in -- for the most part on the change in value to the property,
which in the state of Idaho includes, in my view, and apparently
I'm one offew, but in my view it includes the construction of that
project. Because I think the legislature took seriously the idea that
property owners' rights are inviolate and ifyou are going to
violate them, you 're going to pay them for it and you 're going to
pay them the full value. The full value of it.

So that includes the change changes that are caused by
damage to that property if it's caused in the construction. And it's
not proximate causation. And if the Supreme Court wants to
overrule me, they can overrule me. That's fine.
TT 321-22 (emphasis added). The court also made it clear that the jury would not be limited to
considering damages as of the date of the summons:
And I do have some problems with some of the jury instructions
that have been provided to me so far. Mr. Gourley, in particular I
think the description of what they may consider isn't correct
because you want the damage to be as of the date of the taking.
And for severance damages I would agree, but for the -- that seems
to me it would suggest to the jury that they can't consider all of the
damages allegedly caused by the construction and that's a
completely different thing.
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561. The district court communicated these views to the jury through the phrase
"construction of the improvement project," which appears in several instructions. See, e.g.,
CR 4911 (Instruction No. 20), 4919 (Instruction No. 28). When read together, the phrase
"construction of the improvement project" can only refer to the physical acts of construction,
which all took place after July 11, 2012, and which cannot be legally compensated in an eminent
domain proceeding.
The district court also erred in giving Instruction No. 27:
For purposes of your decision you are to assume ACHD is
responsible for all construction work performed as part of the
Curtis Road Project.
CR 4918. ACHD properly objected to this instruction and the Court noted and acknowledged
ACHD's objections. TT 3998-4000. The basis of ACHD's objection to this instruction relates
back to the court's decision on ACHD's Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment. See CR 328184. The evidence presented during trial, based on the court's prior legal rulings, improperly
focused on the construction activities and alleged damage caused during those activities. Brooke
View was not required to prove how the Entry Walls were damaged, only that they were not
cracked prior to construction, see, e.g., CR 761-63, and this instruction made ACHD liable for all
damages that might have occurred during construction.
As a whole, the district court's instructions constitute reversible error because they
misstate applicable law, mislead the jury, caused prejudice to ACHD, and forced the jury to
award non-compensable damages in an eminent domain proceeding. Leazer v. Kiefer, 120 Idaho
902, 904, 821 P.2d 957, 959 (1991).
F.

THIS COURT SHOULD VACATE THE JUDGMENT AND REMAND THIS MATTER WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $8,512.32.

Judgment was entered in the amount of $148,390.21. CR 5757-59. Given the district
court's error in interpreting Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(a), the judgment improperly included
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$

,000 in a cost-to-cure award due to the damages that allegedly occurred during construction

of the Project. Accordingly, ACHD respectfully requests this Court vacate the Judgment and
remand this matter with instruction to the district court to enter judgment in favor of Brooke
View in the amount of $8,512.32. 25

G.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACHD ITS REASONABLE COSTS As THE
PREVAILING PARTY.

The district court's misinterpretation of§ 7-711 (a)(2) resulted in an over-inflated jury
verdict. Had the jury verdict not been improperly impacted by the court's erroneous rulings and
improper jury instructions, ACHD would have been the prevailing party in this matter and
entitled to an award of the costs incurred. Accordingly, ACHD respectfully requests the Court:
(1) reverse the district court's determination of prevailing party and award of costs and attorney
fees to Brooke View, (2) reverse the district court's denial of costs to ACHD, and (3) remand the
case with instructions to the district court to determine the appropriate amount of costs to be
awarded to ACHD as the prevailing party.

1.

The Criteria for Determining the Prevailing Party in Idaho Condemnation
Cases.

The standards for determining whether an award of costs is appropriate in a
condemnation action requires a two-part analysis. First, the district court must make a
determination of who the prevailing party is under Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and the guidelines
established in Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067, and its progeny of cases. Second, once
the prevailing party has been identified, the court is to determine the amount of costs to be
awarded based on the provisions of Rules 54(d)(l) and 54(e)(3).
25

The difference between the Judgment amount of $148,390.21 less $141,000-which totals
$7,390.21-and the amount of the requested revised Judgment of $8,512.32 is due to the fact
that ACHD conceded this amount at trial. CR 4901. Therefore the revised Judgment should not
be less than this amount.
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The cases setting forth the rules governing an award of costs in eminent domain
proceedings are Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067; Talbot, 120 Idaho 825,820 P.2d 695;

Jardine, 130 Idaho 318,940 P.2d 1137; and Grathol, 158 Idaho 38,343 P.3d 480. Acarrequi
established guidelines to assist the trial court in determining the prevailing party and whether an
award of costs and fees should be made. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. Those
guidelines are:
(1)

whether the condemnor reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at
least 90 percent of the ultimate jury verdict;

(2)

whether the offer was timely and not made "on the courthouse steps an hour
prior to trial"; and

(3)

whether the offer was made within a reasonable period after the institution of
action.

Id. The Supreme Court in Acarrequi also outlined other factors that the trial court may
consider:
(1)

whether the condemnee contested the allegations of public use and necessity;

(2)

the outcome of any hearing on such a challenge;

(3)

whether the condemnor made any modifications in the plans or designs of
the project that resulted from the landowner's challenge; and

(4)

whether the condemnee voluntarily granted possession of the property
pending the resolution of the just compensation issue.

Id.
In determining the prevailing party, the district court is to apply both the Acarrequi
guidelines and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829,820 P.2d at 699. And the
provisions of Rule 54(d)(l)(B) only apply to the extent that they do not conflict with the

Acarrequi guidelines. Jardine, 130 Idaho at 321, 940 P.2d at 1140. The issue of whether a
reasonable offer of settlement was timely made is a case-specific determination, and "[ e ]ach case
will depend on its own circumstances." Id.
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Recently, this Court's decision in Grathol clarified Idaho's standards for cost awards to
condernnors. There, the Court cited to Idaho Code§ 7-718, noting that the provision states that
"[c]osts may be allowed or not, and, if allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the
same or adverse sides in the discretion of the court." Grathol, 158 Idaho at 52, 343 P.3d at 494
(quoting Idaho Code § 7-718). Based upon this provision, the Court overruled the implication
from Acarrequi that cost awards to condernnors could only occur in the "extreme and unlikely''
situation, and confirmed that costs can be awarded to either party within the district court's
discretion (citing Telford Lands LLC v. Cain,154 Idaho 981, 992, 303 P.3d 1237, 1248 (2013).
The Supreme Court in Grathol thereby affirmed the district court's award of costs as a matter of
right and discretionary costs to the condernnor. Id. After Grathol, it is clear that condemnors
may be awarded its costs as the prevailing party. Id.

2.

ACHD is Clearly the Prevailing Party.
a.

ACHD made an offer of settlement of at least 90% of the verdict.

On March 1, 2012-prior to the filing of its Complaint-AC HD made an offer of
settlement to Brooke View in the sum of $7,738.47. CR 5908, 5876. This amount was based
upon the appraised fair market value of the portion of Brooke View's property being taken as
part of the Project and the resulting damages caused to the remainder property. Id.
Subsequently, ACHD made a second settlement offer of$8,512.32 on May 22, 2012-again,
before the Complaint was filed. 26 Id. ACHD's offer represented the fair market value of the
property taken and damages cause to the remainder, plus an additional ten percent (10%). Id.
ACHD made several additional settlement offers in excess of the initial pretrial offers,
including a $45,000 offer on June 5, 2013, which was renewed in September 2013; an offer of
$204,600 on January 6, 2015; an offer of $257,000 on January 13, 2015; and an offer of
$275,000 on January 25, 2015. CR 5870-85. Each of these offers included sums for noncompensable damages occurring during construction, but nevertheless they satisfied the
requirements of Acarrequi. See Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d 1072; see also CR 59196019, 6056-6100.
26
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By comparison, the amount of just compensation awarded by the jury-excluding the
improper damages for impacts and damage allegedly caused during construction-was
$5,291.68. Where the offers made exceeded the jury's verdict, as properly reduced to exclude
non-compensable severance damages occurring during construction, ACHD clearly made an
"offer of settlement of at least 90 percent of the ultimate jury verdict," and satisfied this element
of the prevailing party analysis. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072.

b.

ACHD's settlement offers were timely made and within a reasonable
period after the institution of action.

As noted above, ACHD made its offers of settlement on March 1, 2012 and May 22,
2012. Trial began on April 6, 2015. Therefore, the offers were not "on the court house steps an
hour prior to trial." Jardine, 130 Idaho at 320, 940 P.2d at 1139. To the contrary, the offers
were made before the institution of the action and therefore were timely made. ACHD's
settlement offers of March 1, 2012 and May 22, 2012 were made prior to the filing of the
Complaint, which was dated July 11, 2012. Where the offers were made before the filing of the
action, ACHD clearly satisfies this requirement.
Because ACHD satisfied the Acarrequi requirements, the district court erred when it
failed to conclude that ACHD was the prevailing party. Accordingly, ACHD respectfully
requests the Court reverse the district court's prevailing party determination and attorney fee and
remand the matter with instructions to the district court to enter an order that ACHD is the
prevailing part and entitled to an award of its reasonable costs incurred.

H.

THE AWARD OF DISCRETIONARY COSTS SHOULD BE REVERSED OR REDUCED.

1.

The District Court's Conclusion that this Case Was Extraordinary Was an
Abuse of Discretion.

The district court awarded Brooke View discretionary costs in the amount of
$365,703.63. CR 6609-15. Because ACHD was the prevailing party at trial, the district court's
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award of discretionary costs should be reversed. Additionally, the district court's award of
discretionary costs should also be reversed because the court's justification for this award,
finding the case to be exceptional based on ACHD's pre-trial and trial strategy, was an abuse of
the court's discretion.
This Court reviews discretionary decisions to determine "(1) whether the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether
the trial court reached its determination through an exercise of reason." Hayden Lake Fire Prat.
Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 313, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005) (citing Zimmerman v. Volkswagen
ofAm., Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996)). Discretionary costs can only be

awarded when the costs incurred by the prevailing party are "necessary and exceptional,
reasonably incurred, and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the adverse party."
Id. at 314, 109 P.3d at 168 (quoting I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D)). In this case, the district court abused

its discretion because the basis for concluding that this case was extraordinary was inconsistent
with applicable legal standards.
The district court identified eight reasons to support its conclusion that this entire case
was extraordinary. CR 6609-12. Those eight interrelated reasons can be divided into four
categories: (1) ACHD's pre-trial strategy to exclude evidence of the act of construction and
damages occurring during construction; (2) ACHD's pre-trial strategy that negligence evidence
should not be submitted to the jury unless ACHD was allowed to present negligence defenses
and Brooke View was required to prove proximate cause; (3) ACHD's trial strategy of not
conceding damaging the Entry Walls; and (4) ACHD's expert and lay witness disclosures. Id.
The district court concluded that ACHD's trial strategy, and its persistence in that strategy
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despite erroneous rulings by the court, led to unnecessary waste of time and resources and
increased the cost of litigation. Id.
ACHD's initial pre-trial strategy to exclude acts of construction, including negligence,
and damages occurring after the date of the summons from a condemnation case is consistent
with Idaho Code and precedent. See Section IV.C., supra. Similarly, ACHD's initial pre-trial
strategy regarding tort causation and defenses is also consistent with Idaho law. See Sections
IV.C.6, 7, supra. The district court's rulings to the contrary were inconsistent with legal
standards and could not serve as a basis to conclude that this case was exceptional. That leaves
only the district court's criticism of ACHD's expert and lay witness disclosures. ACHD's
purported failings with regard to expert and lay witness disclosures do not make this case
extraordinary. See Hoaglandv. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900,914,303 P.3d 587,601 (2013)
("Particular standards a court should consider include, but are not limited to, whether there was
unnecessary duplication of work, whether there was an unnecessary waste of time, the frivolity
of issues presented, and creation of unnecessary costs that could have been easily avoided.").
The district court's award of discretionary costs should therefore be reversed.

2.

The District Court's Award of Discretionary Costs Should At The Very
Least Be Reduced.

In the event this Court does not reverse the district court's award of discretionary costs,
that award should at a minimum be reduced. The district court awarded Brooke View
$33,255.74 in discretionary costs for trial exhibits and supplies. 27 CR 6612-13. This award
included $32,319.96 for John Roters' time preparing trial exhibits for himself and other expert
witnesses on behalf of Brooke View. CR 5371. This amount was incorrectly awarded to Brooke

27 The district court awarded Brooke View $500 of this amount as a non-discretionary cost for
trial exhibits. CR 6613.
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View twice - once as Mr. Roters' expert witness fee, and a second time as a cost for preparing
trial exhibits.
Brooke View clarified in its briefing, but not in its math, that it was requesting $5,000 as
expert fees, and the remaining $32,319.96 for preparation of trial exhibits. CR 5371, 5392, 5396.
However, the district court failed to identify this mathematical double-counting and awarded
Brooke View $2,000 in expert fees as a matter of right (CR 6606-08), $35,319.96 as
discretionary expert fees, and an additional $32,319.96 for Mr. Roters' preparation of trial
exhibits. CR 5371-72, 6612-13. Therefore, Brooke View's award of discretionary costs should
be reduced by $32,319.96, the amount of the double-counted trial exhibit preparation costs.

I.

ACHD IS ENTITLED TO COSTS ON APPEAL.

ACHD respectfully requests that the Court award ACHD its costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code §§ 7-718, 12-121 and the standards set forth in Acarrequi, and its progeny cases,
which apply on appeal. 105 Idaho at 87 6-78, 673 P .2d at 1069, 1070-72. Under a corrected
judgment that is consistent with Idaho law and excludes non-compensable elements of damage,
ACHD made an offer of settlement that was at least 90% appropriately determined portion of the
verdict in this case, its settlement offer was timely, and it was made within an reasonable time
after the commencement of this lawsuit. In fact, the offer was made prior to the lawsuit being
filed. Accordingly, ACHD is the prevailing party in this matter and entitled to an award of its
costs on appeal.

V.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, ACHD respectfully requests this Court vacate the
judgment entered by the district court and remand this case with instructions to enter judgment in
Brooke View's favor in the amount of$8,512.32 as just compensation for the taking of its
Property. ACHD further requests this Court vacate the district court's judgment as to fees and
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costs and direct the district court on remand to make a finding that ACHD is the prevailing party
and entitled to its reasonable costs. Finally, ACHD is entitled to its costs on appeal before this
J

Court.
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ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM A
Name

I Rodney Boone

Transcript
927-928

941-945
946-970, 980988

988-990

998-999
Patrick Dobie

1859
1864
1868
1890, 18941898, 19751976

1904-1908
1920-1921
1925-1932
1933, 1946
1954-1958
1974

Richard Evans

1371
1393-1394

Description

I Describing construction evidence he reviewed in
forming his opinions, including pictures of
construction in progress, construction logs, and a
conversation with Chris Hawkins from Alta, the
general contractor for ACHD's Project.
Reviewing ACHD's construction log and progress of
construction activities.
Describing how he identified construction
equipment used on ACHD's Project from
photographs and describing machinery used, its
purpose, and the details of construction in progress.
Describing how soil type affects vibrations from
compacting during construction and identifying the
specific equipment used in the ACHD Project.
Assuming multiple pieces of equipment working at
the same time.
Stating that ACHD's construction plans do not
indicate a need to protect the entry wall.
Stating that ACHD gave contractor notice to proceed
with construction in September 2012.
Stating that ACHD did not perform preconstruction
survey.
Relying on actual construction equipment used
during construction of the ACHD Project to
calculate anticipated vibration levels; discussing the
peak particle velocity created by ACHD's actual
construction of the Project.
Describing progress of construction during site visits
and as depicted in photographs.
Discussing the timing of construction and the
appearance of cracks in the wall.
Describing cracks in the wall.
Discussion how cracks in the entry wall were caused
by vibration and construction of the ACHD Project.
Explaining vibration calculations using actual
equipment from construction of ACHD's Project.
Explaining that one piece of equipment in particular
used during construction of the ACHD Project is the
most likely cause of vibration damage to the wall.
Stating that entry wall was damaged by vibration or
other construction of ACHD's Project.
Explaining that there were no cracks in the wall prior
to construction of ACHD's Project.

1460, 1472
1474-1475
1476
1483-1486

DanGado

1531-1532,
1558-1560
3495-3500
3501-3521

John Guerrero

Chris Hawkins

1014-1020,
1022-1038,
1041-1043,
1048-1049
3351-3367

Sam Howell

3253-3257
3280-3318

Dr. Paul Michaels

2003-2005

2086-2087

2092-2093
2126-2127
2139-2140
2146-2147
Diane Miller

3055
3057-3063

David O'Day

1583-1586

1587-1588

Explaining that the entry wall is failing structurally
because of the construction of ACHD's Project.
Identifying equipment used during construction of
ACHD's Project.
Discussing compaction logs during ACHD's Project.
Explaining that the entry wall is damaged beyond
repair.
Stating that cracks and damage to the entry wall
occurred during construction of ACHD's Project.
Describing progress of construction and equipment
used based on photographs.
Describing test pit excavation and findings; also
water infiltration test.
Describing progress of construction of ACHD's
Project and his observations of the cracks in the
Entry Walls and the foundation of his home.
Describing personal observations of progress of
construction of ACHD's Project.
Describing general process of construction for
ACHD's Project.
Describing his personal involvement and knowledge
of construction of ACHD's Project.
Discussing how entry wall being out of plumb is
evidence of vibration damage and how vertical
cracks are also evidence of vibration damage.
Discussing how there were no cracks in the wall
prior to construction of ACHD's Project and how all
of the cracks are consistent with vibration damage.
Stating that vibration and compacting damaged the
wall.
Stating that cracks in the columns were also caused
by compaction vibrations.
Reviewing ACHD's documentation to determine
vibration data.
Stating that vibrations could have been caused by
excavation during construction of ACHD's Project.
Discussion how took photos of construction work in
progress.
Describing actual construction work performed as
part of ACHD's Project.
Explaining ACHD's failure to perform a
preconstruction survey or take other preventative
measures.
Describing how he identified the equipment used
during construction of ACHD's Project.
2

1665-1668
1682-1686,
1695-1696
1703

I

1709-1711
1713
1721-1723,
1733
1746-1750
1792-1793

1809-1812

John Roters

2307-2310

Brian Smith

2205-2206
2235-2236

Robert Ware

1052-1062

Stating that cracks were not caused by shrinkage or
temperature changes.
Describing progress of construction of ACHD's
Project.
Determining that the wall's structural integrity was
damaged by construction of ACHD's Project.
Explaining how he concluded that vibration from
construction of ACHD's Project damaged the wall.
Describing excavation activities that are likely to
cause vibration damage.
Opining on specific excavation equipment that could
have caused vibration damage and that vibration
from ACHD's project damaged the wall.
Identifying steps ACHD could have taken to monitor
vibrations during construction.
Describing his initial assignment as understanding
the effects of the construction by ACHD on the soil
and damage to the wall.
Stating that ACHD should have done additional
testing before beginning construction and could have
prevented damage to the wall and discussing
ACHD's failure to conduct testing breached
standards in the industry.
Describing debris in landscaping area left by the
construction of ACHD's Project.
Opining that the wall has been structurally
compromised.
Opining that vibration from construction of ACHD's
Project damaged the wall.
Describing his observations of cracks in the Entry
Walls and his personal observations of vibrations
during construction of the ACHD Project.
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ADDENDUMB

ADDENDUMB
Exhibit Number
(By/No.)
Def 27
Def 28
Def 30
Def 31
Def 32
Def 33
Def 34
Def 35
Def 41
Def 42
Def 44
Def 45
Def 48
Def 49
Def 50
Def 51
Def 52
Def 53
Def 54
Def 55
Def 56
Def 57
Def 58
Def 59
Def 60
Def 61
Def 64A-64R
Def 65
Def 66
Def 67
Def 68
Def 69
Def 70
Def 71
Def 78
Def 80
Def 81
Def 82
Def 83
Def 84

Description

Construction equipment used
Examples of work done close to walls
ACHD construction logs
Elements of the project
Compaction areas of project
Photo: foundation crack
Photos of back of wall
Photos of cracks in wall
Caltrans/FTA vibration formula
Calculated PPV for average soil conditions
Field measurements - north wall
Field measurements - south wall
Photos: removed stucco
Photo: crack with paint tear
30" HDPE pipe
12" water pipe
Photos: wall crack #1
Photos: wall crack #2
Photos: wall crack #3
Photos: wall crack #4
Photos: wall crack #5
Photos: wall crack #6
Photos: wall crack #7
Photos: wall crack #8
Photos: wall crack #9
Photos: wall crack #10
Stucco samples
Photo: south wall rebar locations
Photo: north wall rebar locations
Photo: wall crack #1
Photo: wall crack
Photo: wall crack
Photo: foundation cracks
Photo: brick veneer cracking
Compacting machines
PPV motion-distance relationship
PPV jumping jack soil decay
PPV estimates: plate whacker
PPV estimates: jumping jack
PPV estimates: hoe pack

1

Exhibit Number
(By/No.)
Def 85
Def 86
Def 87
Def 88
Def 89
Def 91
Def 98
Def 99
Def 100
Def 101
Def 102
Def 103
Def 104
Def 105
Def 106
Def 107
Def 108
Def 109
Def 110
Def 111
Def 112
Def 113
Def 114
Def 115
Def 116
Def 119
Def 120
Def 121
Def 122
Def 123
Def 124
Def 125
Def 126
Def 127
Def 128
Def 129
Def 130
Def 131
Def 132
Def 133
Def 134
Def 135
Def 136

Description

PPV estimates: double drum roller
PPV estimates: single drum roller
Multiple areas of compaction
Site amplication
In plane vs. out of plane
PPV of compactors in compacted areas
9/11/14 crack map
North wall segment photos
South wall segment photos
Crack photos: segments Nl -N4
Crack photos: segments N4-N5
Crack photos: segment N5
Crack photos: segments N5 -N7
Crack photos: segment N7
Crack photos: segment N8
North wall - east crack photos
Crack photos: segments S 1 - S2
Crack photos: segments S2- S3
Crack photos: segments S3 - S4
Crack photos: segment S4
Crack photos: segments S4 - S5
Crack photos: segment S5
South wall - east crack photos
North wall plumb measurements
South wall plumb measurements
Terracon Boring Logs, Location Plan
O'Day Field Measurements
O'Day north wall photos 7/20/13
O'Day south wall photos 7/20/13
Crack width computation N-1
Crack width computation N-2
Crack width computation N-3
Crack width computation N-4
Crack width computation N-4.5
Crack width computation N-5
Crack width computation N-7
Crack width computation S-1
Crack width computation S-2
Crack width computation S-3
Crack width computation S-4
Crack width computation S-5
Crack width computation: drying
Crack width computation: carbonation

-

--
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Exhibit Number
(By/No.)
Def 137
Def 145
Def 146
Def 147
Def 148
Def 149
Def 155
Def 157
Def 158
Def 159
Def 160
Def 161
Def 164
Def 165
Def 201
Def 203
Def 204
Def 206
Def 207
Def 208
Def 209
Def 210
Def 222
Def 225
Def 233
Def 234
Def 236
Def 238
Def 245
Def 246
Def 250
Def 251
Def 252
Def 253
Def 254
Def 257
Def 258
Def 260
Def 261
Def 262
Def 264
Def 265
Def 266

Description

Crack width computation: temperature
Cemented soil in storm drain trench
Strata test pit log
O'Day in 8/5/13 Strata test pit
8/5/13 Strata test pit
Curtis Rd. section A-A
Photos of ACHD construction
Pear tree removal
I Tip of boundary wall removal by ACHD
Tip of boundary wall built by ACHD
Concrete in landscape area
Irrigation lines destroyed
Landscape bark
Cracks in home interior
Crack width computation N-8
Storm drain construction
Foundation crack map
Photo: showing efflorescence on wall
Examples: cracks near control joints
Crack #8.1 with/without stucco
Photos: block cracks
Total stucco depth on wall
Mini hoe pack
Construction fencing
Landscape elements id'd - north
Landscape elements id' d - south
Picture of cracks in wall
Crack #2 - with/without stucco
Photo: crack measurement
Photo: crack in wall
Michael's drawings on plumb measurements
Sprinklers running
Concrete in landscape area
Photo of wall
Photo of wall
Back of wall
Back of wall
Photo of road-widening work
Photo of road-widening work
Replacement of irrigation pipe
Photo of wall crack
Photo of wall crack
Landscape in front of wall
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Exhibit Number
(By/No.)
Def 268
Def 269
Def 270
Def 271
Def 278
Pltf 1123
Pltf 1124
Pltf 1125
Pltf 1126
Pltf 1127
Pltf 1128
Pltf 1129
Pltf 1130
Pltf 1131
Pltf 1132
Pltf 1133
Pltf 1134
Pltf 1135
Pltf 1139
Pltf 1140
Pltf 1141
Pltf 1142
Pltf 1143
Pltf 1144
Pltf 1145
Pltf 1146
Pltf 1147
Pltf 1240
Pltf 1241
Pltf 1242
Pltf 1243 - Page 1
Pltf 1244
Pltf 1245A
Pltf 1246
Pltf 1247
Pltf 1249
Pltf 1250
Pltf 1251
Pltf 1252
Pltf 1253
Pltf 1254
Pltf 1316
Pltf 1317

Description

Curtis St. canal bridge
Curtis St. sidewalk
Sidewalk construction over canal
Photo - paint crack & human hair
Photo: crack in stucco sample
Photo - ACHD project
Photo - trench
Photo - trench
Photo - pipe into manhole
Photo - irrigation pipe trench
Photo - roller compacting trench
Photo - sidewalk
Photo - excavation near wall
Photo - excavation near wall
Photo - test pit lA near wall
Photo - concrete remnants
Photo - test pit lB near wall
Photo - manhole lid
Photo-wall
Photo-wall
Photo -wall
Photo-wall
Photo - SE comer Lot 1
Photo - SE comer Lot 1
Photo- SE comer Lot 1
Photo -SE comer Lot 1
Photo - SE comer Lot 1
12 Photos of wall
13 Photos of wall
6 Photos of wall samples
Photo - wall sample
2 Photos of wall sample D
13 Photos of crack
25 Pages - Photos of wall samples
6 Pages - Photos of cracks
Wall sample A in plastic container
Wall sample B in plastic container
Wall sample C in plastic container
Wall sample D in plastic container
Wall sample E in plastic container
Wall sample F in plastic container
Photos: wall and cracks
Photos: wall and cracks
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Exhibit Number

Description

(By/No.)

Pltf 1318
Pltf 1319
Pltf 1320
Pltf 1321
Pltf 1322A
Pltf 1322B
Pltf 1323
Pltf 1324
Pltf 1325
Pltf 1326
Pltf 1328
Pltf 1330

Photos: wall and cracks
Photos: wall and cracks
Photos: wall and cracks
Photos: wall and cracks
Photo: wall
Photos: wall and cracks
Photos: wall and cracks
Photos: wall and cracks
Photos: wall cracks
Photos: wall
Photo: street view of wall
Photos: wall

8836418_1
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